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POSSIBLE INDIAN SOURCES FOR THE TERM  
*TSHAD MA'I SKYES BU AS PRAMĀṆAPURUṢA*

The notion of authority is an essential one in any religious tradition. The very foundation of a faith, even a non-theistic faith, is indeed faith. Without some trust or belief that the practices or teachings of a tradition are true, meaningful and to be relied upon, commitment to that tradition is an impossibility. This is not to suggest that such trust must be rational or justifiable, not to mention articulated, but only that in some way it must exist. Even quite circular reasonings—Jesus loves me this I know, for the Bible tells me so, or, the Buddha perceived truths which I cannot perceive or verify, a fact I know from the Buddhist scriptures—nevertheless rely on authority, and require the placement of faith in the source of that authority. It may well be that all such belief is ultimately circular, and that there is no way to objectively ground reliance in any authority. Such issues have of course been the subject of a tremendous amount of attention in many traditions through the ages, from the Greek philosophers, Jewish Talmudists and Indian Mīmāṃsā thinkers to modern epistemologists and hermeneuts. Buddhist thinkers likewise addressed themselves to questions of the justifications of their tradition, the reliability of the Buddhist teachings and the truth of Buddhism. One focus of such attention was the question of how and why the Buddha should be believed. For to be a Buddhist requires that one place trust in Buddhist teaching or practice, and the ground upon which such trust must ultimately stand is the Buddha himself. Without a faith that the Buddha is reliable, there can be no Buddhism. And so there arise at least two questions: how do we know that the Buddha is reliable, and how do we ascertain that we have correctly understood his teachings? These questions have been directly addressed by Buddhist philosophers, especially in India and later in Tibet, as well as by modern scholars of these traditions. In the following, I would like to examine one small aspect of this fundamental issue.

The concept of the “person of authority” is an important one in Tibetan traditions of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (*tshad ma*; *pramāṇa*), and as such has drawn considerable scholarly attention in recent years.<sup>1</sup> The key technical term in later Tibetan discussions is *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, which is employed most centrally in expositions of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, itself an extended commentary on the introductory verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.<sup>2</sup> Although in Dignāga's text and subsequently in Dharmakīrti's the only related and relevant term to appear is *pramāṇabbūta*, rendered regularly with *tshad mar gyur pa*, the classical Tibetan tradition<sup>3</sup> has fixed rather on *tshad ma'i skyes bu* as more expressive of the conception of the individual who embodies the authority and access to liberative knowledge which characterizes Buddhahood. However, as Leonard van der Kuijp has recently suggested, “To all appearances, it was only during the first decade of the fifteenth century that *tshad ma'i skyes bu* became a pivotal concept in a Tibetan understanding of the Buddha and ‘buddhalogical’ gnoseology in connection with the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter and, most importantly, with the *tshad ma* enterprise as a whole.”<sup>4</sup> Despite the considerable efforts put forth in recent years in investigating this particular idea, one problem which has remained is the source of the technical term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* itself which, until now, has often been quoted in Sanskrit in starred form as *\*pramāṇa-puruṣa*. Although van der Kuijp has also been able to trace the term, for example, in the earlier work of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan in the fourteenth century, and connect it with the *sa lugs* tradition of Logic and Epistemology of the Sa skya school, he maintains, in support of the idea that the importance of the concept in Tibet may be thanks to its conceptualization by Tsong kha pa, that “until now the available textual evidence strongly suggested that the central place it came to occupy in Dga' ldan pa / Dge lugs pa *tshad ma* soteriology had no *explicit* Tibetan, let alone real Indian, antecedents.”<sup>5</sup> It may be that the importance and role the notion of the “person of authority” came to hold in classical Tibetan Epistemological traditions after Tsong kha pa are largely or even entirely indigenous, but this does not necessarily force us to conclude that the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* itself did not come from India,<sup>6</sup> despite the reality that heretofore no good candidate has been put forward as an authentic Indian textual source for the term. Now, in the course of research quite unrelated to the Logical and Epistemological traditions, I

believe I have come across what may well be vital clues to the earlier history of the term.

The modern scholarly search for the antecedents of the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* began in 1983 when Ernst Steinkellner suggested that “The ‘earliest’ text it can be found in, is rGyal tshab’s *Tshad ma'i brjed byañ chen mo*.”<sup>7</sup> Almost ten years<sup>8</sup> later Tom Tillemans characterized the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* as “coined by Tibetans to capture the special sense of *pramāṇa* (= *tshad ma*) which figures in the initial half of the homage verse of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.”<sup>9</sup> However, in a note appended to the Preface to the same study in which this comment appeared, Tillemans was able to refer to Steinkellner’s then recent discovery of the term in an obscure Indian commentary, Yamāri’s *Pramāṇavārttikālanikāraṭīkā Supariśuddhi*, translated into Tibetan at the end of the eleventh century,<sup>10</sup> although it was still not possible to confirm the actual Sanskrit form.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, as Tillemans wrote, “The term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* is, thus, *not* just a Tibetan invention, although the actual influence on Tibetans, if any, of this particular passage in a comparatively minor Indian commentary is unclear.”<sup>12</sup>

The Indian antecedents of much other related terminology are, on the other hand, quite clear. Such related terminology includes most centrally the words *pramāṇabhūta*, *prāmāṇya*, and *pramāṇīkṛta*, the first of which is by far the most important in the present context. The word *pramāṇabhūta* is relatively old, being found already in Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*,<sup>13</sup> and known from other non-Buddhist literature.<sup>14</sup> Its history has been explored in detail by David Seyfort Ruegg, in a series of studies.<sup>15</sup> In Indian Buddhist Logical and Epistemological literature, the person who is designated as *pramāṇabhūta* or the like—the figurative meaning of which is roughly a reliable and authoritative source of correct and therefore liberative knowledge—is first and foremost the Buddha himself.<sup>16</sup> Ruegg has suggested that “The earliest attestation so far noted of this word to refer to the Buddha-Bhagavant is found in chap. xxi of the *Lalitavistara*.”<sup>17</sup> There, as Ruegg has pointed out, it appears in parallel with *paramasākṣibhūta*. The Buddha is thus called both supreme witness<sup>18</sup> and, literally, standard or measure (of correct knowledge). Now, the *Lalitavistara* is, on the whole, clearly a rather early text, as attested by a Chinese translation by Dharmarakṣa (竺法護) in the late third century of the Common Era. However, as far as I can tell, the term, and in fact the entire relevant discussion, is missing from

the Chinese parallels, not only in the translation of Dharmarakṣa but even in the later seventh century rendering of Divākara (地婆訶羅).<sup>19</sup> Attestation in either of these translations would have provided some way to fix an earlier date for this appearance of *pramāṇabbūta* in the *Lalitavistara*, the Sanskrit manuscripts of which are of course all extremely late, but it must be admitted that in the absence of such attestation, we really have no good way to date the usage prior to the ninth century Tibetan translation, despite the overall age of the text as a whole.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to the *Lalitavistara* passage, we may point also to an occurrence of the same term in the likewise early *Vinayaviniścaya Upālipariṣcchā*, cited in Sanskrit in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, in which we find the sentence:<sup>21</sup>

All these acts [previously enumerated] which cause karmic obstruction I confess, I reveal, I do not conceal, in the presence of the watching and knowing buddhas, blessed ones, knowers, seers,<sup>22</sup> witnesses, authorities, and I shall be restrained [and will refrain from doing them] in the future.<sup>23</sup>

As in the case of the *Lalitavistara*, however, although the *Upālipariṣcchā* is a relatively early Mahāyāna scripture, having also been translated by the same Dharmarakṣa, the term *pramāṇabbūta* appears to be missing in the earlier Chinese translations, including that of Dharmarakṣa,<sup>24</sup> although in this case it is found in the eighth century translation of Amoghavajra (不空).<sup>25</sup> The quotation in the likewise approximately eighth century *Śikṣāsamuccaya* can also provide some assistance in dating,<sup>26</sup> and in addition we have several commentaries, by (some later) Nāgārjuna,<sup>27</sup> by Jitāri, and by Atiśa, which, though not earlier than the attested translation or quotation, are of some interest. I quote here only the interpretations of the two most relevant terms.

(Pseudo- or Deutero-) Nāgārjuna's commentary is the *Bodhyāpatti-deśanāvṛtti*, in which we read the following explanation of the characterizations of a buddha:<sup>28</sup>

[A buddha is] a witness, one who is aware of the distinction between right and wrong.<sup>29</sup> Since his words and so forth are conclusive (*\*avyabhicārin*), he is an authority (*\*pramāṇa*), and trustworthy/reliable (*\*avisamvādin*).

The two final terms used here would likely evoke for the knowledgeable traditional reader the first verse of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, which begins *pramāṇam*

*avisamvādi*, although the direct context there is rather different, since the verse continues *jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ* (1) *avisamvādanam* (1a-c), the discussion not concerning any person at all.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, as Ruegg has stated, “what ultimately grounds the idea of the Buddha-Bhagavant as *pramāṇabbūta* is the concept of *pramāṇa* defined in terms of *avisamvāda(na)* ... , which is then connected with the idea of being settled in its efficaciousness in bringing about a congruent result (*arthakriyāsthiti* ...) as stated in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, k. 1ac.”<sup>31</sup> It is most likely that this Deutero-Nāgārjuna has couched his expression here in the language of the Logical and Epistemological tradition of Dharmakīrti, making almost explicit reference to the first verse of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

There may have been one or two scholars by the name Jitāri, belonging to the eighth or eleventh centuries.<sup>32</sup> If there really were two Jitāris, the latter may have been a teacher of Atiśa. Be that as it may, some Jitāri composed a commentary on the Confession text just referred to, the *Bodhyāpattideśanāvṛtti Bodhisattvaśikṣākrama*, in which he treated the entire phrase quoted above as a unit:<sup>33</sup>

As for “All these [in the presence of] the watching and knowing buddhas, blessed ones, knowers, seers, witnesses, authorities [I confess],” one confesses all the masses of one’s transgressions [to them]. Being aware of all aspects [of reality] (*\*sarvākārajñā*), directly perceptive,<sup>34</sup> eloquent (?),<sup>35</sup> not speaking lies, being a doer (?),<sup>36</sup> very compassionate—these are the six aspects of the Tathāgata’s good qualities (*\*guṇa*).<sup>37</sup> The remainder is understood [easily].

Atiśa then says in his eleventh century *Karmāvaraṇaviśodhanavidhibhāṣya*:<sup>38</sup>

When one is a witness, he is aware of all the facts without error. One is an authority precisely because he is a witness.

Penultimately in this regard we may note that the term *tshad mar gyur pa* also appears in the Tibetan translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, in a quotation from the *Gaganagañjasūtra*. But there are significant differences between the Tibetan and Sanskrit texts here, the Sanskrit equivalent is *prāmāṇika* (or almost certainly it is rather to be read *aprāmāṇika*), rather than *pramāṇabbūta*, and while the Kanjur Tibetan translation of the scripture agrees with—indeed is almost certainly quoted by—the Tibetan text of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, all Chinese versions of the passage give no indication that any special term is

being employed here.<sup>39</sup> Therefore in all likelihood this passage cannot be considered to present an actual occurrence of the term *pramāṇabbūta*.

Although even the genuine instances of the term *pramāṇabbūta* cited above cannot be shown to be early, Helmut Krasser has pointed out that the term *pramāṇabbūta* does already appear in Sanskrit in Āryaśūra's poem *Pāramitāsamāsa*.<sup>40</sup> The problem here is that, first, it is not completely certain whether this author is to be identified with the author of the *Jātakamālā*, and, secondly, even if he is, the date of that Āryaśūra itself is not entirely agreed upon. Michael Hahn places the author of the *Jātakamālā* (whom he calls Āryaśūra I) in the middle or early fourth century, but seems inclined to place the author whom he calls Āryaśūra II closer to, but preceding, Śāntideva, and close to Kambala, perhaps, as I understand him, in the early sixth century.<sup>41</sup> Here of course the original appearance of the term *pramāṇabbūta* in the text is guaranteed since the *Pāramitāsamāsa* is entirely in verse. Therefore, despite our present inability to be certain about the occurrence of *pramāṇabbūta* in older Buddhist scriptural sources, it seems to have been in use at least by one Buddhist philosopher-poet by around the sixth century, and, pending a more secure dating of the text, the *Pāramitāsamāsa* passage might now be regarded as the oldest presently known Buddhist reference to the Buddha as *pramāṇabbūta*.

While *pramāṇabbūta* then is clearly an older and Indian term, non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist, the history of the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* is much less clear. To explore what may prove to be its Indian roots, we shall have to turn away from the Logical and Epistemological tradition which is the home of the term in Tibet.<sup>42</sup>

A number of Indian scriptural commentaries discuss the opening stock phrase of Buddhist sūtras, "Thus I have heard on one occasion" and so on, the famous *evam mayā śrutam* formula.<sup>43</sup> In the course of some of these discussions the point is raised that someone, usually but not invariably held to be Ānanda, heard the preaching of the Buddha's sermons, and the subsequent tradition then relies upon the textual transmission from this auditor. But how can one know that the initial transmission is reliable and trustworthy? In response to this question several Indian Buddhist commentators introduce the notion of authority or of the person of authority. Perhaps the earliest such commentary I have so far identified is one authored by Jñānagarbha, who belongs to the eighth century. Jñānagarbha's

treatment of the opening stock phrase of Buddhist scriptures is found in his *Anantamukhanirbāradhbāraṇī-ṭīkā*.<sup>44</sup>

The Introduction [to the scripture] (*\*nidāna*) is taught as having eight aspects according to the distinction of what is to be established (*\*sādhya*) and their means of establishment (*\*sādhana*). Briefly here what is to be established is accepted as having three aspects, and the means of establishment as having five.

Thus the Introduction [to the scripture] is divided into two aspects according to the distinction of what is to be established and the means of establishment. What is to be established refers to the act of the compiler (*\*saṃgītikāra*) making himself an authority (*\*pramāṇīkṛta*?), so that his words may produce in others certainty with respect to this discourse on the Teaching, because when certainty is produced, people will obtain what they seek by firm practice, but when it is not they will not obtain it.

That act [of the compiler] of making himself an authority is taught through three aspects: domain (*\*viśaya*), body (*\*kāya*) and intrinsic nature (*\*svabhāva*). Of these, the domain is the point of the scripture (*\*sūtrārtha*) which is presented below. Body is he himself, the compiler [Ānanda?]. Intrinsic nature is the clear ascertainment [of the sense of the scripture] obtained through the aural cognition (*\*śrotravijñāna*). These are explained in order by the three terms “THUS” and so on [I and HEARD, respectively].

The means of establishment [through which the compiler makes himself an authority] are taught in five aspects. (1) The distinction of time is expressed as “ON ONE OCCASION.” When the time is related to the preceding [clause], in order to produce certainty in the assembly it is taught that he himself [Ānanda?] has heard much (*\*babuśruta*) [= is very learned]. So it is taught: “Thus I have heard at one time, but at other times I heard other things. Therefore I have heard much [= I am very learned], and the speech of such an individual as I is trustworthy.” When the time is related to the following [clause], it means that although the Blessed One dwelt at that one time at Vaiśālī, at other times he dwelt in outlying regions.<sup>45</sup> Therefore it is taught that those who desire happiness should resort to those [other] locations as well.<sup>46</sup>

The relevant terminology employed here in Tibetan is *tshad ma nyid du bya ba*, which may represent a Sanskrit form like *\*pramāṇīkṛta*, although this would be a non-standard equivalent.<sup>47</sup> However, of course, this is not exactly the term we are looking for. For that we have to turn to Haribhadra, one of the great figures of Indian Buddhist scholasticism, whose *Abhisamayālamkāra* is a work of tremendous influence. We will examine this work in a moment, but first we should glance at Haribhadra’s relatively short commentary to the *Ratnaguṇasamcayagāthā*, his *Bhagavad-Ratnaguṇasamcayagāthā-nāma-Pañjikā*.<sup>48</sup>

Here one should consider the circumstances of the Introduction stated with “THUS I HAVE HEARD.” In answer to the questions “when, from whom, by whom, where and together with whom did you hear the precious scripture?” [the compiler] in order to make himself known as an authoritative source (*\*prāmāṇya*) will take these up in order. The indication of the time, location, teacher and assembly is the predominant cause (*\*pradbhānabetu*) and [forms] the Introduction.

Here again we have a related notion, but expressed in slightly different vocabulary. Our first true key to the puzzle, however, is found in Haribhadra’s illumination of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*, cast as a commentary to the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, his famous *Abhisamayālamkāraloka Prajñāpāramitāvyaḅhyā*. There we find the following:<sup>49</sup>

With this as the Setting, now in answer to the question “when,<sup>50</sup> from whom, where, together with whom did you hear such a precious scripture as this?” in order to make himself known as an authoritative source (*prāmāṇya*) he speaks the Introduction which as the motivation for the teaching states the entirety of the place, time, assembly, teacher: he says “ON ONE OCCASION,” which attached to the preceding means “[I] heard at one time.” For this reason, because there is no constant perception<sup>51</sup> of such scriptures as these, equal to wish-fulfilling gems, the difficulty of obtaining [such scriptures] is stated by the expression of the fact of their occasional occurrence [hence, once, not always].

Or, saying “at one time I heard this jewel of a scripture, at another time another,” the compiler speaks in an indirect way of his own great learning [= his having heard much] for the sake of [inspiring confidence in] beings, in accord with the maxim of the compassionate king of physicians.<sup>52</sup>

Or, the meaning is that everything was heard in one instant, because as in a dream thanks to the influence of divinities and others in only the very shortest time one experiences the passing of a hundred years and so on, just so thanks to the influence of the Blessed One the aural cognition, whose source is the mental cognition which is the immediately preceding precondition, and which manifests the meaning of the entire scripture, appears in one instant. In this way he speaks of his own status as a person of authority (*pramāṇapurūṣatā*), saying “because I have obtained the gateway to inconceivable liberation, I hear in one instant everything whatsoever that there is for me to hear, and do not forget it.” For just that reason, when the compiler has later on gradually begun teaching in order to assist other groups of people who need to be trained, even when somehow in the meantime, because he is not constantly concentrated, his mind slips to other things that were left unexpounded [by the Buddha], there is no problem with the recitation of the entire scripture at a later time, because his understanding filled with illumination by the influence of the Tathāgata was engendered right at the beginning.

Specifically here we must point to the existence in the Sanskrit text of Haribhadra’s *Āloka* of the words *prāmāṇya* and *pramāṇapurūṣatā*. The Tibetan translation here renders *prāmāṇya* with *tshad*

*ma'i skyes bu* and *pramāṇapurusa*tā with *tshad ma'i skyes bu nyid*. The actual occurrence of these terms in Haribhadra's text, in Sanskrit and with their corresponding Tibetan forms, allows us first of all now to finally erase the asterisk which has been placed before the form *pramāṇapurusa*, marking it as a hypothetical reconstruction of *tshad ma'i skyes bu*. At the same time, this text forces us to recognize the possibility that *prāmāṇya* may also be represented, in the proper context, by the same Tibetan term.

In addition, we must note here that the Sanskrit term *pramāṇapurusa* in fact exists in at least one popular Indian text in a rather ordinary context, in the *Hitopadesa* in the story of the quarrel over a woman between the two demons Sunda and Upasunda which in this case requires adjudication by a judge or arbiter, *pramāṇapurusa*,<sup>53</sup> here Śiva, who orders the two to fight. The date of this episode, however, is quite uncertain,<sup>54</sup> and at least in one classic version of the same basic story found in the *Mahābhārata*, the narrative follows a somewhat different line with no term strictly parallel to *pramāṇapurusa*.<sup>55</sup>

Before we return to Haribhadra, we should note a few other passages in other scriptural commentaries which contain similar discussions. Tāranātha, who in such matters, however, is not completely trustworthy, places the author Mañjuśrīkīrti in the same period as, among others, Daṃṣṭrasena, who may belong to the mid-eighth century.<sup>56</sup> If, however, Mañjuśrīkīrti as the author of a commentary to the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* is the same person who appears to have been a teacher of Atiśa, this would then place him considerably later, in the tenth century.<sup>57</sup> The full title of Mañjuśrīkīrti's commentary to the *Samādhirāja* is the *Ārya-sarvadharma-svabhāva-samatā-vipañcita-samādhirāja-nāma-mahāyānasūtra-ṭīkā Kīrtimālā-nāma*, usually abbreviated as *Kīrtimālā* for obvious reasons. Perhaps a detailed study of this commentary would give some hint as to the period of its composition. In any case, this commentary contains the following:<sup>58</sup>

Now, in answer to the questions "when, from whom, where, with whom did you hear such an incomparable precious scripture as this?" the compiler, in order to make himself known as an authority (*\*pramāṇa*), mentions the place and so on, saying "ON the ONE OCCASION when this was HEARD," meaning "on one occasion I heard this precious scripture, but at another time I heard others." Just as a compassionate king of physicians [reassures his patient by making known his great knowledge],<sup>59</sup> by this the compiler indicates that he himself is greatly learned [= has

heard much], and this has the intention of indicating that he is one who has heard all such precious scriptures.

This comment is clearly very similar to that of Haribhadra just quoted above, although it is more likely that they both share a common approach than that one directly influenced the other.<sup>60</sup>

To the ninth century belong a number of other scholars, some of great importance in Tibet. Among them is Vimalamitra.<sup>61</sup> His *Ārya-Prajñāpāramitābhūdaya-ṭīkā* contains the following:<sup>62</sup>

Some great ones [like Dignāga?] may say “People will recognize the speaker as an authority (*\*pramāṇa*) if, in order to establish himself as authority (*\*pramāṇa*), he speaks of having witnesses having [stated] the place and time, and having taken the assembly as his witness.” That is not how I understand it. [For understood] in this way, if [in order to verify the authority of the speaker it were necessary that] one go to those lands [in which resides the assembly to which the scripture was preached] and question the witnesses [oneself], those who are unable [to do so] would be kept far from a determination of the meaning of the scripture. Again, in the case of such scriptures as these [like the *Heart Sūtra*] in which the names of those in the assembly are not indicated, how could one be required to point out the witnesses?

Very similar is the treatment in the same author’s *Ārya-Sapta-śatakā-Prajñāpāramitā-ṭīkā*.<sup>63</sup>

If one says that in order for someone to establish himself as an authority (*\*pramāṇa*) the [specific indication of] time and place are the legal evidence (*\*pramāṇa*) and the assembly the witnesses (*\*sākṣin*), as in the case of a disputed contract [in which the contesting parties present evidence and witnesses], that is not my understanding.<sup>64</sup> [For understood] in this way, if one must go throughout the land questioning witnesses, those who cannot go there would be hindered in determining the sense of the scripture for a long time. And in the case of [those scriptures] in which the names of those in the assembly are not indicated, whom should one question?

It is very interesting to see that Atiśa Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna (c. 982-1054)<sup>65</sup> has directly discussed Vimalamitra’s understanding, including Vimalamitra’s disagreements with Dignāga, in his own comment on the *Prajñāpāramitābhūdaya*.<sup>66</sup>

[According to Dignāga and others] the Introduction [to a scripture] is the historical setting and what follows that. The Opening has two forms, the General and the Specific Openings. The distinction between these two is that the General is found in all scriptures, and [the Specific] in this scripture but not in others. There are four parts to the General Opening: time, teacher, location and assembly. There are two parts to the Specific Opening, the preeminent one [Avalokiteśvara?]<sup>67</sup> and the assembly in concentrative meditation. This is the concise meaning (*\*piṇḍārtha*). The meaning of the purpose (*\*prayojanārtha*) is that if the compiler in order to establish

himself as a person of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*) were to state with witnesses and with words that indicate the fact (*\*artha*) that "I heard just at that time this teacher [speaking to] these assemblies in this location," [people] would believe the compiler thinking "well, this explanation of his is true." Thus, it is similar to the fact that in the [ordinary] world too by carefully examining the witnesses and the facts (*\*artha*) one determines "his claim is true." As the Ācārya Dignāga said:<sup>68</sup>

In order to establish himself as an authority the complier indicates the Teacher as the component element which brings about the active engagement of those possessed of faith, as well as the assembly which acts as witness, and the place, time, and so on; [here] in the world the indication of place, time and so on, when set forth in terms of possessing witnesses, secures [the complier] himself as an authority.

The verbal meaning (*\*padārtha*) of these [verses] and their connections (*\*anusandhī*) are clear. Therefore, it is indicated in [Dignāga's] *Concise Commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines* that all scriptures are to be explained in that fashion. The remainder is agreed. Here Vimalamitra denies that, and in making manifest his own position he objects to the former. [For Vimalamitra] there are two faults in that [position], inability and not becoming a witness.

In that regard inability means that one is unable to establish the purpose. Now, [Dignāga says that the compiler] states that [introductory formula] as the component element which brings about the active engagement of faithful followers in order to establish himself as a person of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*). And the purpose of the witness is that if deep doubts arise at a later time, one meets him [and clarifies the matter], but as a result it will not be possible for those who have obtained the magical powers (*\*ṛddhī*) or superknowledges (*\*abhijñā*) to ascertain the meaning of the scripture [directly, which should be possible, but according to this understanding would be ascertainable only by consulting a witness], and a witness may dwell in nirvāṇa or somewhere else [that is, have died and so be unavailable to clarify the matter].

Atiśa here makes use of precisely the term of greatest interest to us, *tshad ma'i skyes bu*. I will suggest below that the appearance of this term in a work of Atiśa may be no coincidence.

In addition, the relevant term appears with close to the same referent in at least one other work of the same Atiśa, his auto-commentary to his *Bodhipathapradīpa*, called *Bodhimārgapradīpa-pañjikā*. There we read:<sup>69</sup>

If I were to speak in this way of all the approaches of the great scholars (*\*mahā-paṇḍita*) of the past, my book would become excessively large. These great ācāryas became persons of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*) in the Mahāyāna path (*\*mahāyāna-mārga*), studied in great benevolence (*\*mahāmaitrī*) and great compassion (*\*mahā-karuṇā*), their minds firmly settled in the two aspects of the aspiration to awakening (*\*bodhicitta*).<sup>70</sup> Some ācāryas among them had obtained perfection (*\*siddhī*) in the Great Seal (*\*mahāmudrā*). Some had perceived the truth. Some having attained the great [state] of the highest mundane qualities (*\*laukikāgradharma*) [the highest stage

of the *Prayoga-mārga*] are those who obtained the teaching from an Incarnation Body (\**nirmāṇakāyā*). It should be understood that those [ācāryas] are indeed the great path itself, since just as they maintain, so the Blessed One said in the scriptures too.

Here Atiśa is clearly referring to people other than the (or a) Buddha as *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, and as having great spiritual authority. This usage corresponds with other uses we have seen above; the context suggests that he may have had in mind specific figures such as Indrabhūti, Nāgārjuna, Śāntideva, Asaṅga, Daṃṣṭrasena, Candragomin, Śūra and Śāntarakṣita,<sup>71</sup> but here the word does not refer to one who compiles the scriptures, the *saṃgītikāra*.

A further association of the person of authority with the compiler of scripture is provided, however, by the use of this trope in a comparison. In the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-nāma-Prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstravṛtti Dur(ava)bodhāloka*, a sub-commentary to Haribhadra's short *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* commentary, *Sphuṭārtha*, composed by Chos kyi grags dpal (\*Dharmakīrtiśrī), apparently Atiśa's main teacher, sometime before 1005 and translated into Tibetan by Atiśa and Rin chen bzang po between 1042-1045,<sup>72</sup> Maitreya is praised as the author of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*. Commenting on the second verse of the *Sphuṭārtha*,<sup>73</sup> after explaining the name *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, Chos kyi grags dpal writes:<sup>74</sup>

Was [the text] produced either through [personal] reflection, or through aural reception handed down from a traditional source? No, and for that very [reason], it is said: "Having heard it from the Lord Ajita [= Maitreya]." Because he is the supreme one among gods and men, and because, being the preeminent one in the world (\**lokajyeṣṭha*), he is unassailable by Maheśvara and others, he is called Ajita [invincible]—it is known by implication that having personally heard it [from Maitreya, the author Asaṅga] well considered it, and contemplated it in meditation (\**bbhāvanā*); thus having made it known, [he composed the treatise]. Even though he may also be one who received a *samādhi* [vision], being the same one who heard it directly from the author of the *kārikās* in accord with his zealous faith, in this regard he became a person of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*) just like a compiler (\**saṃgītikāra*).<sup>75</sup> But in this respect others are also learned (\**babuśruta*), and endowed with mindfulness and intelligence (\**smṛti-saṃprajanya*)—the meaning of which is that they may somehow be dominant over the commentator here; how much more so over others who have a conceited view of their own wisdom?<sup>76</sup>

Here then the *tshad ma'i skyes bu* is—apparently—Asaṅga, who is compared in this regard to the compiler of scripture.

The word *tshad ma'i skyes bu* appears again in a sub-commentary to the *Madhyamakāvātāra* of Candrakīrti, the *Madhyamakāvātāra-*

*tīkā* of Jayānanda, a Kashmiri. However, since this author belongs to the twelfth century, and since the work in question appears to have been written in eastern Tibet or the Tangut country, it is hard to say whether and in what sense it should be considered an Indian text per se.<sup>77</sup> Yet, in what may again be a relevant connection, we may note here that this author too is not unconnected to Atīśa; he is listed as the principal translator into Tibetan of Atīśa's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*.<sup>78</sup> In his seventh century autocommentary *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya* introducing *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.12, Candrakīrti says:<sup>79</sup>

Therefore, having thus refuted [the idea of] production from oneself examined from the perspective of other traditions of learning which desire to understand true reality, in order to demonstrate that this idea is not acceptable even as conventional expression (*\*laukikavyavahāra*) to those who have not familiarized themselves with other traditions of learning, we state [—then follows verse VI.12].

In Jayānanda's sub-commentary to *Madhyamakāvatāra*, then, we read:<sup>80</sup>

Having thus demonstrated the critique that production from oneself is not acceptable, in order to demonstrate the critique from a conventional [point of view] the text says “thus” and so on. As for the expression “examined from the perspective of other traditions of learning which desire to understand true reality,” those who desire to directly perceive reality as it is are those who desire to understand true reality, [here] non-Buddhist sectaries (*\*tīrthika*). For precisely that reason the text says “desire.” [This specifies that] they do not acquire [that understanding; they merely seek it]. “Other traditions of learning” are understood as Sāṃkhya and so forth. What they have examined is examined through their intelligence, but it has no substantial basis. “Having refuted” means through logic. As for “even as conventional expression to those who have not familiarized themselves with other traditions of learning,” because they did not pay attention to the doctrines (*\*siddhānta*), they are not familiar with other traditions of learning. Since conventional expression is not made familiar through [particular] lineages (*\*paramparā*) [but rather is commonly known to everyone in the world], conventional intelligence [exists] as its expression. “This idea” refers to the production from itself. Even while accepting [the possibility of] a person of authority in the conventional sense (*jig rten pa'i tshad ma'i skyes bu*), production from itself is still not established, since we do not accept just any ordinary person as a source of authority (*\*pramāṇa*) even in the worldly sphere. Therefore the text says “who is not familiarized.”

One other term must also be dealt with here. The form *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* has been suggested by van der Kuijp to represent a sort of transition between *tshad mar gyur pa* = *pramāṇabhūta* and *tshad ma'i skyes bu* = *pramāṇapurusa*.<sup>81</sup> While I am not certain that it is necessarily correct to consider *tshad ma'i skyes bu* as a contraction

of *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*,<sup>82</sup> the latter term does appear, in fact already in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra-bhāṣya*, as pointed out by Ruegg.<sup>83</sup> The text reads:<sup>84</sup>

The treatise was composed by a person of authority (*tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*), and by determining the intention of the scripture (*\*āgama*) arising from a perception of the non-erroneous interpretation of the scripture,

The approach to be explained here is established in accordance with the original way of the noble Nāgārjuna, because he comprehended the profound nature of things through reason as well as through scripture. [*Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.3]<sup>85</sup>

As Ruegg also noted, this word is then explained in Jayānanda's twelfth century sub-commentary, his *Madhyamakāvātāra-ṭīkā*.<sup>86</sup>

If the treatise of a person of authority lacks the perception of a non-erroneous interpretation of the scripture, it is asserted that it is difficult for one who uses independent inference (*\*svatantra*) to determine the intention of the scripture. Now, the teacher whose own point of view is stated saying “the treatise composed by a person of authority (*tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*) non-erroneously determines the intention of the scripture arising from a perception of the non-erroneous interpretation of the scripture” is referred to as an authority (*tshad mar gyur pa = \*pramāṇa-bhūta*); since he is both an authority (*tshad mar gyur pa*) and a person (*skyes bu = \*puruṣa*), he is a person of authority (*tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*). [This refers to those such as] the Venerable Ārya Nāgārjuna and others. The treatises composed by them are the *Mūlamadhyamaka[kārikā]* [called] *Prajñā*, and so on.

In addition, the same term appears in chapter nine of the *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāvaviveka,<sup>87</sup> the chapter on Mīmāṃsā, a text translated into Tibetan by, again, Atiśa. With regard to verses IX.3–4 of the *Madhyamakabhūdayakārikā*, part of the *pūrvapakṣa*, Bhāvaviveka has the Mīmāṃsāka say:<sup>88</sup>

Whatever claim is made by the Sāṃkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, Nirgranthas [Jainas], Nāstivādins, Buddhists, and so on that [respectively] Kapila, Kāṇāda, Nagna (= Mahāvīra), 'Jig rten 'di pa (= Lokāyata?), Buddha and so on [the founders of these traditions] have the quality of being persons of authority (*tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu nyid*), this is not acceptable, since:

Human speech is untrue because it is corrupted by the faults of lust and the rest, but the Veda is maintained to be an authority / source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)<sup>89</sup> because it has no human author.<sup>90</sup> (3)

Because humans are always accompanied by lust [hate and delusion], and ignorance, a fact established in one way can be proved to be otherwise, as for instance a scriptural text which says “While it might be true to say ‘On the bank of this river, there grows fruit,’ in a hundred cases it would be true, but in another hundred cases it would not.”<sup>91</sup> [So,] if human speech is not a source of valid knowledge, what can

be a source of valid knowledge (*tshad mar gyur pa* = \**pramāṇabbūta*)? The self-existent Veda is authoritative / a source of valid knowledge (\**pramāṇabbūta*), because it has no human author. In what fashion is it without a human author?

And because no author is remembered, it is maintained [by us] that the Veda has no human author. This [Veda] is authoritative scripture (*āgama*) because its transmission is not broken. (4)<sup>92</sup>

The point here is clarified by Bhāvaviveka's response in the *uttarapakṣa* ad *Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikā* IX.23:<sup>93</sup>

If you [the Mīmāṃsāka opponent] maintain that the speech of a human is not a source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because it is corrupted by faults, then the reason is inconclusive with respect to [the example of] the speech of experts in gold and others [which is in fact authoritative and a source of valid knowledge].

One can entertain doubt regarding the statements of some people in the world. For example, when someone claims "on this river bank there is fruit," then it seems possible that while there may be [fruit] in a hundred cases, in another hundred there is not. Yet [while the claims of some people may in fact be false], there may be no doubt regarding the statements of some others, because [in those cases the person speaking] is an authority for the whole world (\**sarvalokapramāṇabbūta*), as with an expert in gold and others. Therefore, it is affirmed that the reason (\**betu*) given is inconclusive (\**vyabhicāra*). [The reason] "because [the speech] is human" is inconclusive [because there are two possibilities]: it may be like the case of the speech of a person who states "There is fruit on the riverbank," which is not authoritative, or on the other hand like the speech of people knowledgeable about gold and others, which is a unique authority / source of valid knowledge.<sup>94</sup>

Additionally, we again find the term *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* in the same context in Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, written in the eighth century and extant in Sanskrit and a twelfth century Tibetan translation. In Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* we have the following verses (2365-2367):<sup>95</sup>

For the Veda even though it is established does not produce knowledge for us so long as it is not illuminated by persons who are like lamps. And from this it is not to be assumed that its nature of being a non-human production is the cause of true knowledge, for this knowledge issues from the explanations of persons. Hence, the fact that the Veda is not a human production, even if true, is meaningless. For the desired result of that is knowledge, which is dependent upon persons.

Kamalaśīla's commentary to this reads as follows:<sup>96</sup>

The fact that [the Veda] is not a human production is assumed in order [to make] the knowledge [derived from the Veda] true. But even that assumption is not capable of producing that knowledge without regard to persons, so the assumption

is pointless. Let only persons who are authorities (*puruṣā eva pramāṇabbūtāḥ* = *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*) and guides be the causes of true knowledge—but in that case what is the use of the fact that [the Veda is] a non-human production which [merely] attends what has already been proven?

We cannot determine from these passages what the relation might be between the term *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* on the one hand, and *tshad mar gyur pa* = *pramāṇabbūta* and *tshad ma'i skyes bu* = *pramāṇapurūṣa* on the other. While the discussion in Jayānanda's text might suggest that *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* really does represent a combination of *tshad mar gyur pa* and *skyes bu*, and thus perhaps *\*pramāṇabbūtapuruṣa*, we must keep in mind first of all that this author might very well have been thinking and working within a Tibetan rather than an Indic environment. In addition, the only attestations of Sanskrit equivalents to Tibetan *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* I have discovered so far are *puruṣā eva pramāṇabbūtāḥ*, as just quoted from Kamalaśīla and, as we will see below, *pramāṇapurūṣa* in Haribhadra's *Āloka*. Only further evidence will help clarify the issue.

A number of problems no doubt remain. In the Logical and Epistemological literature, the person who is designated as *pramāṇabbūta* is first and foremost the Buddha himself, and only very secondarily some other distinguished teacher. There is good reason, however, to question whether the notion employed in many of the texts examined above is really the same as that found in the Epistemological literature. Ruegg, for example, has suggested that in the context of the Epistemological tradition those who are “authoritative” are such

only in a secondary and derivative way, that is, in so far as they are already in the first place *pramāṇa(bhūta)*. To put this in another way, their authoritativeness results, by derivation, from the fact of their being persons who have direct knowledge (*śākṣātkāra*) of reality, which is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) for them. ... [H]e who is *pramāṇabbūta*, and a *\*pramāṇapurūṣa*, is an authority for another person as a result of already possessing immediate knowledge of reality.<sup>97</sup>

Ruegg goes on to state that

to translate these two terms [in an Epistemological context] by ‘being/become an authority’ and as ‘person of authority’ respectively tends to obscure the essential quality of immediacy and directness that attaches to *pramāṇa*, substituting for it a concept that usually implies mediacy and indirectness, namely that of one person's depending on another who functions for him as an external means of knowledge, that is, as an authority.<sup>98</sup>

If Ruegg is correct here, then the usage of these related terms in many of the passages quoted above not only does not fit the model Ruegg has constructed for the Epistemological literature, it stands in almost complete opposition to this model. In fact, Ānanda as the compiler of the scriptures, the *saṃgītikāra*, is reliable and authoritative precisely because it is *not* his level of understanding or insight that is decisive.<sup>99</sup> Until just before his recitation of the scriptures at the First Council, and certainly when he actually heard them preached, Ānanda was not a saint (*arhat*) and did not possess ultimate insight. His authority comes, on the contrary, from his absolutely reliable transmission of the teaching of that one who *is* the ultimate authority (or ultimate transmitter of authority), namely the Buddha himself. Moreover, the very authority of scripture rests in part, in a mediate rather than an immediate way, on the reliability of Ānanda, and his fidelity in transmitting the teachings as he first heard them, rather in the capacity of an amanuensis. This leads us to the conclusion that a fundamental sense of the terms *pramāṇabbūta*, *pramāṇapurūṣa*, *prāmāṇya* and *pramāṇīkṛta* used with respect to Ānanda or another compiler differs from the sense such terms appear to have in the Epistemological literature. In addition, there appear to be others who stand somewhere in between.

In his commentary to *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* XVIII.31, Vasubandhu states that “the normal and true sense is that elicited, which is to say explicated, either by a teacher who is himself an authority or by one whom this teacher made into an authority (*pramāṇīkṛta = tshad mar mdzad pa*).”<sup>100</sup> As Ruegg has noted,<sup>101</sup> Sthiramati further discusses the passage in his sub-commentary *Sūtrālamkāravṛtti-bhāṣya*:<sup>102</sup>

With respect to the expression “the meaning taught by an authority,” there are two types of scripture: scriptures whose meaning is definitive (*\*nītārthasūtra*), and scriptures whose meaning is to be elicited (*\*neyārthasūtra*). In this regard, an authority is (1) someone like a buddha-blessed one, or (2) a bodhisattva who is an individual (*\*pudgala*)<sup>103</sup> [made into] an authority by a buddha-blessed one, or a great auditor,<sup>104</sup> or one whom the Tathāgata foretold in prophecy (*\*vyākaraṇa*), such as the Ācārya Nāgārjuna.<sup>105</sup> The expression “reliance on the meaning taught by an authority” means reliance on the meaning taught as peerless. This indicates reliance on scriptures of definitive meaning, not on scriptures whose meaning is to be elicited, because one does not rely on explanations that the aggregates, spheres and so on really exist.<sup>106</sup>

Here Sthiramati recognizes that someone other than a Buddha may be an authority, but nevertheless the fact remains that those who might be designated as such are those whose own level of understanding is profound. Since this is plainly not the case with Ānanda, one usage we have encountered above still appears to differ. So the question we must ask is whether we cannot find in an Indian text a usage of *pramāṇapurūṣa* which corresponds more closely to its usage in the later Epistemological and Logical tradition.

And this brings us back to Haribhadra. Haribhadra is credited with four commentaries related to the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, among which are his famous *Āloka* and the shorter *Sphuṭārtha*.<sup>107</sup> In commenting on *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* II.5 in the latter work Haribhadra writes:<sup>108</sup>

[Why does the Buddha not perceive things? This is] in accord with his characteristics, which comprehend what was explained extensively and thoroughly as not insisting on [the reality of] the Stage of Joy and other stages, since the Tathāgata having awakened to Awakening does not perceive any things (*dharmā*), which is reasonable by the argument that a person of authority (*pramāṇapurūṣa*) does not perceive [such things].

The key sentence here is commented upon in Dharmamitra's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-sūtra-tīkā Prasphuṭapada* as follows:<sup>109</sup> "This expression 'by the argument that a person of authority does not perceive [such things]' indicates scripture as a source of valid knowledge (*\*āgamapramāṇa*), according to the text which says that one seated on the seat of awakening (*\*bodhimaṇḍa*) sees no dharmas arise or decay, and so on." This would tend to suggest that the *pramāṇapurūṣa* here is a buddha. The same *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* verse is again treated by Haribhadra, and in much the same way, in the *Āloka*,<sup>110</sup> where the specific context is a comment on a sentence of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*:<sup>111</sup> "For a bodhisattva-mahāsattva who is practicing thus [as previously explained] dwells in accord with this state of the perfection of wisdom, and without losing touch with this mental concentration." The *Āloka* then says:<sup>112</sup>

What follows from that? [The scripture] says "For thus" and so on.<sup>113</sup> Thus one dwells in accord with [this] state of the Perfection of Wisdom, the essence of which is the highest mundane qualities comprehended through meditative cultivation. [The quotative particle] *iti* [which here indicates that the sentence expresses the thought of a bodhisattva] means that this topic is concluded. The meaning of this sentence is as follows: Since a Tathāgata who has awakened to awakening apprehends no things (*dharmā*) whatsoever as truly real, therefore in light of the

understanding that these phenomenal entities appear as having intrinsic natures which are nothing more than illusions, through the meditative cultivation whose content is the negative perception<sup>114</sup> made reasonable by the argument that a person of authority (*pramāṇapurūṣa*) does not perceive [such things], in order to comprehend the highest mundane qualities [it was explained in scripture] in detail that one should mentally cultivate the idea that one must not insist upon false attachment to the Ten Stages as representing the fruit of stream-entry, the state of one who has made progress, and the rest.

It is very interesting to note here that, as mentioned above, the Sanskrit text's *pramāṇapurūṣa* is rendered in Tibetan with *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*. In any case, here again the person of authority, if not actually identified with a buddha, is certainly one whose own understanding is profound. A final example appears in the late tenth century<sup>115</sup> Ratnākaraśānti's commentary to the *Sūtrasamuccaya* (attributed, although doubtfully, to Nāgārjuna), the *Sūtrasamuccaya-bhāṣya Ratnālokālaṅkāra*, the Tibetan translation of which dates to the eleventh century.<sup>116</sup> Commenting on a quotation from the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*,<sup>117</sup> Ratnākaraśānti writes:<sup>118</sup>

The assembly disputed in a way similar to what was taught earlier by some people of erroneous misconception (*\*mithyākalpanā*), and asked “why [is there only one vehicle, not two or three]?” In answer, the establishment according to custom<sup>119</sup> of the person of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*) as one whose very nature is tradition (*\*āgamasvabhāva?*) is stated with “[the buddhas] of the ten directions.” In order to clear up the erroneous misconception that by coming to this realm characterized by the five defilements (*\*pañcakaṣāya*) the Blessed One Śākyamuni is inferior, by means of the maxim (*\*nyāya*)

All buddhas are equal;  
But not in their length of life, name and family,

[the scripture] says “[the buddhas] who appeared in the past” and so on.

Here the identification of the *tshad ma'i skyes bu* with a buddha can hardly be doubted. As we have seen above, then, the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* appears in a number of genuinely Indian texts, most available only in Tibetan translation, but some also in Sanskrit. It appears in the Tibetan translation of Haribhadra's *Āloka* (several times) and *Sphuṭārtha*, where it clearly translates *pramāṇapurūṣa*, though also *prāmāṇya*, and on the other hand *pramāṇapurūṣa* also appears as *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* in the *Āloka*. *Tshad ma'i skyes bu* occurs again in \*Dharmakīrtiśrī's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* sub-commentary, and Ratnākaraśānti's *Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya Ratnālokālaṅkāra*, as well as in works the Indian provenance of which is a bit less sure, such as

Jayānanda's sub-commentary to the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and Atiśa's commentary to the Heart Sūtra and his auto-commentary to his *Bodhipathapradīpa*.

While some of these texts may not have been well-known in Tibet, this can hardly be said of Haribhadra's works. Thus it now seems at least possible to suggest that it was the appearance of this word in the *Sphuṭārtha* and the *Āloka* which gave later Tibetans the—or an—idea or inspiration for their further development and use of the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* as a technical term in the context of Epistemology. In fact, we may be able to go somewhat farther than this, and suggest who may have coined the technical term in Tibetan to begin with.

While Haribhadra's *Āloka* was translated into Tibetan by Rinchen bzang po, that translation was revised by Atiśa;<sup>120</sup> the translation of \*Dharmakīrtiśrī's work is also due to Atiśa, his student; and Jayānanda shows himself to have been well acquainted with Atiśa as well since he translated that scholar's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*. The Tibetan rendition of the *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāvaviveka (in which the form to appear is however *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*) is likewise due to Atiśa. These facts together with the appearances of the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* in several works of Atiśa himself lead to the observation that apparently most of the earliest examples of the Tibetan term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* found so far can be connected somehow to Atiśa in the early eleventh century.<sup>121</sup> Would it be going too far to suggest then that it may have been Atiśa himself who coined the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, probably as a translation of *pramāṇapurūṣa*? It is no doubt prudent to state here clearly that I do not assert there to certainly be a direct link between these earlier appearances of the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* and the later discussions in the Logical and Epistemological literature dealing with the opening homage verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Rather, I am content to present to specialists in the Tibetan Logical and Epistemological traditions the new problems raised by this confirmation of the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* = *pramāṇapurūṣa* in several well-known Indian texts—the Tibetan translations of which are often connected in one way or another with Atiśa, and some much studied in Tibet—and in commentaries authored by (and translated into, if not actually initially written in, Tibetan by) the very same Atiśa.

## NOTES

\* That I dare even this minor foray into the forbidding field of Buddhist Pramāṇa studies is due in the first place to the encouragement and support I received from Leonard van der Kuijp. I obtained much invaluable advice and a number of corrections of my translations from Shōryū Katsura. For his kind help with the passages from Bhāvaviveka, I am very grateful to David Eckel. Needless to say, neither these friends nor anyone else is responsible for the doubtlessly numerous errors that remain; for these I alone take the blame.

When I discussed a draft of this paper with colleagues at the Thirty-sixth International Congress of Asian and North African Studies in Montreal in August 2000, John Dunne kindly informed me of the parallel studies undertaken by his student James Apple. Mr. Apple subsequently exhibited great generosity in sharing with me the results of his work. His kindness brought to my attention several important references, and moreover by sending me copies of his materials he enabled me to check the Peking Tanjur versions of several other passages I had been able to consult previously only in the Derge edition. I want to record here my special thanks for Mr. Apple's liberality.

Since I lack access to other sources, most of the passages quoted below from Tibetan are, unfortunately, based only on the Derge Tanjur, and therefore cannot be considered even minimally critically edited. I was able to find a number of instances of the terms in question thanks to computerized data of the Asian Classics Input Project, a source for which all scholars in the field should be grateful—but, as is absolutely necessary with these versions, I verified all citations, in this case in the Taiwanese reprint of the Rumtek Derge.

<sup>1</sup> In chronological order of publication date see: Steinkellner 1983, 1989; Tillemans 1993; Ruegg 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Krasser 1996; and van der Kuijp 1999 (also already 1987); Hakamaya 2000.

<sup>2</sup> For a recent introduction to Dharmakīrti's conceptualization of the issues raised by the first verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, see Franco 1994, revised in 1997b: 15–43. Cp. also Jackson 1988, and 1993. On the last see the remarks of Franco 1997a—perhaps justified in content but quite ungenerous and combative. (I find it ironic in this regard that Franco 1999: 255 is himself critical of the tone of Claus Oetke who, he says, “confuse[s] sharpness of argument with sharpness of expression.”)

<sup>3</sup> I use the term “classical” here rather loosely. More precisely, van der Kuijp 1989: 6 has proposed “that what I shall call the Classical Period [of Tibetan Logic and Epistemology] commences with Sa-pan [that is, Sa skya paṇḍita, and in particular his *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter* of ca. 1219]; what I shall call ... the Post-Classical Period began in the fifteenth century, and this period is characterized by a reappraisal of Pre-Classical *tshad-ma*, by critiques of Sa-pan's work, and by its defense.” In these terms, then, we have to do rather with the Post-Classical period, but I think that in the present context we can avoid such a complex vocabulary. (van der Kuijp tells me that he now believes these labels themselves need some revision.)

<sup>4</sup> van der Kuijp 1999: 648.

<sup>5</sup> van der Kuijp 1999: 648; I have tacitly corrected the punctuation of the last clause. In summing up, at 1999: 669 he says “In Tibet, in spite of canonical precedents, the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, ‘the person of authority,’ and some of its cognates, as epithets of the Buddha or one who is regarded as enlightened, whether used hyperbolically or not, did not quickly gain widespread currency and was used very infrequently before the fifteenth century.”

<sup>6</sup> Pace for example Jackson 1993: 168, n. 5, who calls *tshad ma'i skyes bu* “a term for which there seems to have been no Sanskrit prototype.” Hakamaya 2000: 29 (300), n. 68, is more cautious, calling the term one “not yet confirmed in extant Sanskrit literature.”

<sup>7</sup> Steinkellner 1983: 275, and n. 3. Although Steinkellner acknowledges that Rgyal tshab's text is compiled from notes of Tsong kha pa's lectures, he does not recognize the use of the term itself as directly due to Tsong kha pa. We can now confirm the appearance of the word *tshad ma'i skyes bu* once in Tsong kha pa's own *Lam rim chen mo*, where it appears in the discussion of *vīrya*; in my copy, which seems to be of the same edition as that recorded in the Ötani catalogue (No. 10098, in volume *pa* of the Complete Works; Ötani University 1973; I think this must be the Zhol edition), the passage is at 259b1, but the reference there cannot, I believe, be to a buddha. Of course, this citation hardly changes the date which Steinkellner assigned to the word.

The related term *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*, discussed below, appears also in Tsong kha pa's *Bstan bcos chen po Dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal*, his sub-commentary to Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, in a very close paraphrase of *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.2; see Ogawa 1988: 12 = Peking edition folio 65b, translated in Ogawa 1988: 349. The *Madhyamakāvatāra* passage itself is discussed below. It is not unlikely that these or related word forms also occur elsewhere in Tsong kha pa's oeuvre.

<sup>8</sup> Although his book carries a 1993 imprint, Tillemans's preface is dated 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Tillemans 1993: 5.

<sup>10</sup> Steinkellner and Much 1995: 103. See Cordier 1909: 443 for the colophon.

<sup>11</sup> Apparently a Sanskrit manuscript of this text exists in Tibet, so it may be possible to verify the Sanskrit form someday. See Steinkellner and Much 1995: xx. Incidentally, Kimura 1995a: 89 pointed out in his review of Tillemans's book that the page reference in the Peking Tanjur edition of Yamāri's commentary is misprinted; 240a6 should be 240b6.

<sup>12</sup> Tillemans 1993: vi. I can find absolutely no justification for the statement by Kimura 1995b: 228, referring to Tillemans, that “E. Steinkellner [*sic*] has argued that ‘tshad ma [*sic*] skye [*sic*] bu’, a very important term for Tibetan Buddhist Logicians, is derived from Yamāri's commentary.” I cannot say whether Steinkellner might agree with Kimura that Yamāri's thought “strongly influenced Tibetan Buddhist Logic,” but in Tillemans's book at any rate no argument of Steinkellner's is offered for anything at all.

<sup>13</sup> Ruegg 1994b: 309. van der Kuijp 1999: 647 is wrong when he says “It seems that E. Franco was the first to indicate that ... *pramāṇabhūta* is already found in

Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya," referring to Franco 1989. In the first place, Franco himself 1989: 98, n. 8, indicates very clearly that the source of his notice is Albrecht Wezler; secondly, van der Kuijp has overlooked the fact that already Jackson 1988: 361, n. 12 mentioned the point, referring to the unpublished comments made in 1987 by Richard Hayes in which the use by Patañjali was mentioned. Hayes himself tells me (email 12 July, 2000) that the reference was first brought to his attention in the 1970s by Curt Oliver, to whom it was pointed out by their teacher of traditional grammar, T. Venkatacharya. There would have been no particular need to point out this usage or publish any remark on it, of course, unless and until it was framed for instance in the context of the later Buddhist use.

<sup>14</sup> The notion of authority, *prāmāṇya*, in the Indian grammatical traditions has recently been investigated by Madhav Desphande 1998. The term *pramāṇīkṛta* likewise is quite standard Sanskrit and can be found for example in *Kathāsaritsāgara* Bk. 4 tar. 22.170 (Durgaprasād 1903), as well as in *Śākuntala* and the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, according to Böhtlingk and Roth 1855–1875: IV.1050b (s.v.).

<sup>15</sup> Particularly Ruegg 1994b, but also 1994a, 1995. (When these overlap, I do not necessarily cite each reference to a particular idea.)

<sup>16</sup> Despite this figurative meaning of *pramāṇa* in most relevant contexts, below I heed the strong advice of my friend Shōryū Katsura and translate in most cases very conservatively and basically mechanically as “authority.” This has the advantage of not prejudging the nuances with which the vocabulary might be or have been read or understood.

<sup>17</sup> Ruegg 1995: 821, and see also 1994a: 412–413, 1994b: 306. Text at Lefmann 1902–1908: 319.9. The *Lalitavistara* passage was already cited in this context by Hattori 1968: 74. It was discussed by Jackson 1988: 338 (who also states with regard to the term *pramāṇabbūta* that “[t]he epithet’s first appearance seems to be in the *Lalitavistara*”), but I am afraid that his translation of the sentence in question is far from accurate.

<sup>18</sup> Ruegg 1995: 821 “being a direct witness/realizer in the highest degree.” In 1994a: 412 he translated “le Témoin suprême ... et le Critère (ou: la Norme) connaissant.”

<sup>19</sup> Absent in Divākara’s T. 187 *Fangguang dazhuangyan-jing* 方廣大莊嚴經 (III) 594c–595a, and Dharmarakṣa’s T. 186 *Fosuo puyao-jing* 佛說普曜經, in which it is not quite so clear where the passage would be if it existed ([III] 518c–519a?).

<sup>20</sup> The Tibetan translation, which is credited to Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Munivarman and Ye shes sde, contains the term; see Foucaux 1847: 280.9–10: ... ’on gyis kyang bcom ldan ’das nyid lha dang bcas pa’i ’jig rten gyi dpang du gyur pa dang | tshad mar gyur pa dam pa lags so | |. Note that this seems to understand *parama* as modifying not just *sākṣībhūta* but also—or even instead—*pramāṇabbūta*. In Foucaux’s translation from Tibetan 1848: 306 he faithfully follows this: “De plus, Bhagavat lui-même est devenu le témoin des dieux ainsi que du monde [rather: the world together with its gods], il est devenu la meilleure autorité.” The two terms have been conflated into one in the translation of Foucaux from Sanskrit 1884: 272 and in Bays 1983: 482 in which we find only “témoin suprême” and “supreme witness,” respectively.

In his recent remarks, Hakamaya 2000: 4 (325) and 20-21 (309-308), nn. 16-17, has differently understood several aspects of the issue, including the place of the term *parama* and the Tibetan rendering of *sākṣī*. He does not correct the faulty reading of his xylograph which has *dbang* for the obvious *dpang*, which leads him to suggest an unnecessary emendation of the Sanskrit text (*sākṣī* to *\*vāśī*). On the other hand, he has well noted that the presence of the term *pramāṇabhūta* in the *Lalitavistara* cannot be shown to be old (2000: 14 [315]).

<sup>21</sup> MS Cambridge Add. 1478, folio 81b7-8 = Bendall 1897-1902: 170.9-11 = Python 1973: 35-36 (§25) (I follow the orthography of the manuscript, and mark the half-daṇḍa with a comma): tatsarvvaṃ karmāvaraṇaṃ teṣāṃ buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ jñānabhūtanāṃ caḥṣurbhūtanāṃ sākṣibhūtanāṃ pramāṇabhūtanāṃ jānatāṃ paśyatāṃ agrataḥ pratideśayāmi , āviṣkaromi na praticchādayāmy āyatayāṃ samvaram āpadye. The Tibetan translation of the sūtra (Python 1973: 35): has: ... de dag thams cad | sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das ye shes su gyur pa | spyen du gyur pa | dpang du gyur pa | tshad mar gyur pa | mkyen par gzigs pa de dag gi spyen sngar mthol lo || 'chags so || mi 'chab bo || mi sbed do || slad chad kyang sdom par bgyid lags so ||

<sup>22</sup> The vocabulary here is known in Pāli, as we find the Buddha characterized in *Majjhima-nikāya* i.111.12-13 as cakkhubhūto nānabhūto dhammabhūto brahmbhūto. I quote only the explanations for the first two, which are parallel with the terms in our passage, from the commentary *Papañcasūdanī* (Dhammagiri-Pāli-Ganthamālā vol. 15, devanāgarī edition of the Vipassana Research Institute, Igatpuri, 1995: 390.10): svāyaṃ dassanapariṇāyakaṭṭhena cakkhubhūto | viditakaraṇaṭṭhena nānabhūto |, “He is a seer in the sense that he is a leader [who leads others toward] seeing, a knower in the sense that he makes [things] known.” These explanations and others are also quoted in Aggavaṃsa’s *Saddanīti* (Smith 1929): II.555.3-12; the latter passage was noted by Ruegg 1994b: 313, although not in this connection.

<sup>23</sup> The frame of the sentence—I confess, and promise never to do it again—is basically the standard confession formula, found in Pāli already in the Vinaya and Nikāyas.

<sup>24</sup> T. 325 *Foshuo jue ding pini-jing* 佛說決定毘尼經 (XII) 39a, the translation of Dharmarakṣa, and T. 310 (24) *Youboli-hui* 優波離會 (XI) 516a by the eighth century Bodhiruci.

<sup>25</sup> T. 326 *Foshuo sanshiwu foming lichan-wen* 佛說三十五佛名禮懺文 (XII) 43a17-18: 證實者、稱量者 = *\*sākṣibhūta pramāṇabhūta*. Shirasaki 1989b: 113, n. 82, refers to T. 1582 *Pusa shanjie-jing* 菩薩善戒經 (XXX) 961b4-6 as a parallel. There we read 如於現在釋迦佛前、如來世尊、真實知見、其 [v.l. 具] 智無礙、淨眼無障、常爲一切衆生證人. This translation is attributed to Guṇavarman 求那跋摩 in the late-fourth/early-fifth century. It is not completely clear to me whether this translation renders *pramāṇabhūta* at all, and if so, which term is intended for it. The *Pusa shanjie-jing* is on the whole an alternate version of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but with an introductory portion adapted from the *Vinayaviniścaya*. However, there is much controversy over the exact nature and origins of the text, concerning which see Ōno 1954: 183-204 (esp. 196), Naitō 1962, and Okimoto 1973.

<sup>26</sup> The tenth century translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, T. 1636 *Dacheng jipusaxue-lun* 大乘集菩薩學論 (XXXII) 108c29–109a1, has: 此諸業障佛以真實惠、真實眼、真實證明、真實稱量、悉知悉見, a translation which certainly seems to represent *pramāṇabhūta* with 真實稱量. The Tibetan translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* has (Derge Tanjur 3940, *dbu ma, kbi* 95b2; Peking Tanjur 5336, *dbu ma, ki* 112a2–3): de dag [P: ø] thams cad ye shes su gyur pa | [P: ø] spyen du gyur pa [P: |] dpang [D: dbang] du gyur pa tshad mar gyur pa'i [P: te] sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das mkhyen cing gzigs pa de dag gi spyen sngar so sor bshags so || mthol lo || mi 'chab bo || slan chad kyang sdom par bgyi'o ||

<sup>27</sup> Shirasaki 1989a: 91 is emphatic that this author is entirely other than the Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna.

<sup>28</sup> Derge Tanjur 4005, *mdo 'grel, ji* 186a1, Peking Tanjur 5506. Edited in Shirasaki 1989a: 124: dbang [read: dpang] po ni legs pa dang nyes pa'i khyad par thugs su chud pa'o || tshig la sogs pa 'khrul pa med pas na tshad ma ste mi slu ba'o ||

<sup>29</sup> See Kane 1968–1977: III.330–360 for a discussion of witnesses in Indian law.

<sup>30</sup> See Ruegg 1994b: 316, and van Bijlert 1989: 120ff.

<sup>31</sup> Ruegg 1994b: 318.

<sup>32</sup> See Tsukamoto, Matsunaga, and Isoda 1990: 294, and Ruegg 1981: 100, n. 312.

<sup>33</sup> Derge Tanjur 4006 *mdo 'grel, ji* 191b2–3, Peking Tanjur 5507. Edited in Shirasaki 1989b: 113: de dag thams cad sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das ye shes su gyur pa | spyen du gyur pa | dpang du gyur pa | tshad mar gyur pa | mkhyen cing gzigs pa zhes bya ba ni | nyes pa'i tshogs thams cad bshags pa'o || rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa dang | mngon sum du gzigs pa dang | gnya' drag mdzad pa dang | brdzun [Shirasaki: rdzun] mi smra ba dang | mdzad pa dang | thugs rje che ba ste | de bzhin gshags pa'i yon tan rnam pa drug go || lhag ma ni go bar zad do ||  
Translated in Shirasaki 1990: 230–231.

<sup>34</sup> Shirasaki 1990: 231 translates *mngon sum du gzigs pa* with *genkan* 現觀, usually a standard translation of *abhisamaya*.

<sup>35</sup> Shirasaki 1990: 231 translates *gnya' drag mdzad pa* with *yūben* 雄弁, eloquence. The term *gnya' drag* appears in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* VIII.166, where it renders *mukhara* which, however, has there, as usually, the negative sense of “excess talking.” The term *mukharīkr* means to cause to resound, make noisy, or make others talk; might it refer to the power to bestow eloquence on others?

<sup>36</sup> Shirasaki 1990: 231 translates *mdzad pa* with *riyaku shujō no seiyaku* 利益衆生の誓約, vow to benefit beings. I cannot understand this.

<sup>37</sup> I have been unable to trace any other reference to such a category. There is almost certainly some correlation with the six epithets of the Buddha here quoted, as Yoshifumi Honjō has suggested to me, but I cannot detect the nature of this correlation.

<sup>38</sup> Derge Tanjur 4007, *mdo 'grel, ji* 196a4; Peking Tanjur 5508, *mdo 'grel, ji* 238b8–239a1 (the latter courtesy of Kaie Mochizuki): dbang [read: dpang] du gyur pa ni don thams cad phyin ci ma log par mkhyen pa'o || tshad mar gyur pa ni dbang [read: dpang] du gyur pa de nyid kyi phyir ro ||

On this text see now Mochizuki 1999.

<sup>39</sup> Derge Tanjur 3940, *dbu ma, kbi* 150a2–3; Peking Tanjur 5336, *dbu ma, ki* 175a3–4: tshul khirms rnam par dag pa ni | 'phags pa nam mkha' mdzod kyi mdo las gsungs te | sems can rnam par dag pa'i phyir byang chub kyi sems dang mi 'bral ba dang | tshad mar gyur pa rnam par dag pa'i phyir nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi sems med pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

MS Cambridge Add. 1478, folio 118b6 = Bendall 1897–1902: 271.16–17: śīlavīśuddhir āryagaganagañjasūtre evābhihitā | avirahitabodhicittatā cittavīśuddhyai , apagataśrāvakaṇṭakabuddhacittatāprāmāṇikavīśuddhyai ityādi ||

Note here especially *sems can* (\**sattva*) in place of *citta* (*sems*), and the syntactic oddity of *tshad mar gyur pa* (which somehow must be understood as the object of purification?). Furthermore, both Chinese translations of the sūtra quoted below with 無限量 and 不限—as well as the sense of the passage— suggest that we might read *aprāmāṇika*<sup>o</sup>. Cp. the *Lalitavistara* passage at Lefmann 1902–1908: 89.9–10, with variants in vol. 2, p. 39, and see also now Hokazono 1995: 452.9–10, with n. 25 (but for some appreciation of the textual value of these works, see de Jong 1998): mā ānanda tathāgataṃ prāmāṇikaṃ kārṣuḥ | tat kasmād dhetoḥ | aprameyo hy ānanda ..., the Tibetan translation of which in Foucaux 1847: 84.2–4 reads: kun dga' bo de bzhin gshegs pa la ni tshad du ma byed cig | de ci'i phyir zhe na | kun dga' bo de bzhin gshegs pa ni tshad med cing .... (It is interesting to contrast this expression utilizing the concept of *pramāṇa* with those quoted in the present paper; here the Buddha is *not* to be made into a measure, *pramāṇa*, since he is immeasurable, a meaning different from the assertion that the Buddha *is* to be taken as an authority, *pramāṇa*. Peter Skilling has reminded me here of the passage in *Aṅguttara Nikāya* v.140.)

The Chinese translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* T. 1636 *Dacheng jipusaxue-lun* 大乘集菩薩學論 (XXXII) 127b20–22 has: 論曰。此復明尸羅清淨。如虛空藏經云。遠離聲聞辟支佛心、於菩提心不生退轉、則於尸羅而得清淨。Here I cannot find any trace of *pramāṇa*; but we may remark that the term 無退轉 is found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (T. 1579 [XXX] 565c8–9) where the equivalent (Wogihara 1936: 369.22–23) is *aparibhīyamāṇa*. It is well known that the Song period Chinese translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, as with other translations of that period, shows many serious misunderstandings, and a mix up of \**aprāmāṇika* with \**aparibhīyamāṇa* is certainly imaginable.

The scripture passage being quoted is the following: Derge Kanjur 148, *mdo sde, pa* 255a2–5: rigs kyi bu bryad po 'di dag ni byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyi tshul khirms yongs su dag pa ste | bryad gang zhe na | 'di lta ste | sems rnam par dag pa'i phyir byang chub sems dang mi 'bral ba dang | tshad mar gyur pa rnam par dag pa'i phyir nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi sems med pa dang | dam bcas pa rnam par dag pa'i phyir bslab pa thams cad mi 'dor ba dang | smon lam yongs su dag pa'i phyir skye ba thams cad du mi 'jug pa dang | mngon par 'du mi byed pa yongs su dag pa'i phyir mi lhod pa dang | mtshan ma yongs su dag pa'i phyir byang chub tu bsngo ba dang | nyon mongs pa yongs su dag pa'i phyir kun nas gdud pa med pa dang byang chub yongs su dag pa'i phyir smon lam yongs su rdzogs pa ste | rigs kyi bu bryad po de dag ni byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyi tshul khirms yongs su dag pa'o ||

In Amoghavajra's translation T. 404 *Daji daxukongzang pusa suowen-jing* 大集大虛空藏菩薩所問經 (XIII) 617b28–c6: 次若菩薩成就八法、能淨修行淨戒波羅蜜多。云何爲八。所謂、不離菩提心戒清淨故。離聲聞緣覺心得無限量心戒清淨故。不

捨一切學處智慧清淨故。於一切處受生願清淨故。於戒不緩任運無作行清淨故。迴向菩提魔羅心清淨故。心無熱惱煩惱清淨故。大願圓滿菩提清淨故。是爲菩薩成就八法、能淨修行淨戒波羅蜜多。

In the translation of the early fifth century Dharmakṣema 曇無讖, *Xukongzang-pin* 虛空藏品, part of the *Mabāsainipāta = Dafangdeng daji-jing* 大方等大集經 T. 397 (8) (XIII) 96c28–97a5: 菩薩成就八法能護淨戒。何等爲八。善男子、諸菩薩不忘菩提心能護於戒。不求聲聞辟支佛地能護於戒。持戒不限於戒能護於戒。不恃諸戒能護於戒。不捨本願能護於戒。不依一切生處能護於戒。成就大願能護於戒。善攝諸根爲滅煩惱能護於戒。是爲菩薩成就八法能護淨戒。

It is worth noting that the *Gaganagañjasūtra* is quoted a number of times in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, and although I have noticed some differences between the Tibetan translation in the Tanjur and the Sanskrit text as printed by Bendall, in my brief glance I have not noticed the same type of strange non-correspondence in other quotations. See Bendall 1897–1902: 33.11–12 = Derge Tanjur 3940, *dbu ma, kbi* 24b1; 44.21–47.12 = 31a7–32a5; 50.1–2 = 33a3; 51.14–19 = 34a4–6; 117.7–10 = 67b1–2; 126.15–16 = 72b6–7; 270.9–271.3 = 149a2–149b3; 271.16–272.8 = 150a2–150a7.

<sup>40</sup> Krasser 1996: 180, in *Pāramitāsamāsa* II.21 (text in Meadows 1986: 180).

<sup>41</sup> Hahn 1993: 37–38. See also Meadows 1986: 21.

<sup>42</sup> Steinkellner 1983: 276 wrote “Nowhere, however, is the Buddha called a *tshad ma'i skyes bu* (Skt. *\*pramāṇapurūṣa*) in the relevant Indian texts.” As we will see, this may depend on the conception of what is “relevant.”

<sup>43</sup> I am at currently preparing a monograph which examines these discussions; the present paper grew out of that research.

<sup>44</sup> Although there may well have been more than one scholar named Jñānagarbha, Ruegg 1981: 104, n. 330 (see also 69, n. 224), at least, seems willing to accept the eighth century Jñānagarbha as the author of the *Anantamukhanirbhāradhāraṇī-ṭīkā*. Inagaki has demonstrated some aspects of Haribhadra's debt to Jñānagarbha's thought in Inagaki 1977 = 1987: 353–364; see also 1987: 76–84.

I was helped much in making my translation by Inagaki 1999: 31–32, with whose understanding, however, I differ on a number of points. Compare also Horiuchi 1996: 161–163, with whose renderings likewise I cannot always agree. The text is edited in Inagaki 1987: 115–116:

bsgrub bya sgrub pa'i bye brag gis || gleng bslang rnam pa brgyad du bstan ||  
mdor na 'di la bsgrub bya gsum || sgrub pa rnam pa lngar 'dod do ||  
'di ltar gleng bslang ba ni bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa'i bye brag gis rnam  
pa gnyis su 'gyur te | bsgrub par bya ba ni yang dag par sdud par byed pas bdag nyid  
tshad ma nyid du bya ba yin te | de'i tshig gis chos kyi rnam grangs 'di la gzhan dag  
gi nges pa bskyed pa'i phyir dang | nges pa skyes na mi rnams nan tan byed pa la  
gnas pas 'dod pa 'thob par 'gyur gyi | de lta ma yin na mi 'thob par bstan pa'i phyir  
ro ||

tshad ma nyid du bya ba de yang | yul dang | lus dang | rang gi ngo bo dang  
rnam pa gsum gyis bstan te | de la yul ni mdo'i don 'og nas 'byung ba rnams so ||  
lus ni bdag nyid de yang dag par sdud par byed pa'o || rang gi ngo bo ni rna ba'i  
rnam par shes pas nges par 'dzin pa ste | 'di skad ces bya ba la sogs pa'i tshig gsum  
gyis de dag go rim bzhin du bstan to ||

sgrub pa ni rnam pa lngas bstan te | dus kyi bye brag ni dus gcig na zhes bya ba ste | de yang gang gi tshe gong ma dang sbyar na de'i tshe 'khor rnam kyi nges pa bskyed pa'i phyir bdag nyid mang du thos par bstan te | 'di ltar bdag gis dus gcig na thos kyi | dus gzhan na yang gzhan dag thos so || de bas na bdag ni mang du thos pa yin te | de'i bdag gi tshig ni yid ches par bya ba yin par bstan pa'i phyir ro || gang gi tshe 'og ma dang sbyar na de'i tshe dus gcig na bcom ldan 'das grong khyer yangs pa can na bzhugs kyi | dus gzhan gyi tshe ni gud na yang bzhugs te | de bas na yul de dag kyang legs pa 'dod pa rnam kyi bsten par bya ba yin par bstan to ||

<sup>45</sup> *gud na* = on the side, perimeter?

<sup>46</sup> The remaining four means of establishment are the Blessed One as preacher, his dwelling itself, the place in which he dwelt, and the retinue with whom he dwelt.

<sup>47</sup> Ruegg 1995: 822 gives *tshad mar byas pa* and *tshad mar bzhag pa* as standard equivalents.

<sup>48</sup> On the contested authorship of this work, see Obermiller 1932a: 10, n. 5, and now in considerable detail Isoda 1987. Yuyama 1976: 1 (and already 1973: 276) noted the existence of a Sanskrit manuscript of the commentary. A fragment of that manuscript has just been published in Jiang 2000. However, this single leaf does not contain the section quoted here, although Jiang suggests that more information about the entire manuscript may be available soon (2000: 117, §1.4). In any case, at least for the present section the phrasing is so close to that found in the *Abhisamayā-lamkāraloka* that the text might be “reconstructed” from Tibetan into Sanskrit with some confidence—a fact which may be of some relevance to the above mentioned discussion concerning the authorship of the work. (As an illustration of the dangers of such “reconstruction,” however, compare Amano 1975 with 2000.)

Derge Tanjur 3792, *shes phyin, ja*, 2b1-2: de la 'di skad bdag gis thos pa zhes bya ba'i gleng gzhi'i skabs bsam par bya ste | gang gi tshe | gang la [*read: las?*] | gang gis | gang du | gang dag dang lhan cig mdo sde rin po che khyod kyi thos zhes 'dri pa rnam la | lan du bdag nyid tshad mar rtogs par bya ba'i phyir rim pa bzhin du sbyar ro || dus dang | yul dang | ston pa po dang | 'khor rnam kyi tshogs la bstan pa ni gtso bo'i rgyu ste gleng gzhi yin no ||

<sup>49</sup> Wogihara 1932-1935: 6.20-7.10 and Tucci 1932: 8.4-24: evam upodghāṭam kṛtvedānīm kutaḥ katra kaiḥ sahaivam sūtraratnam tvayā śrutam iti praśnān ātmā-prāmāṇyapratipādanāya visarjayan deśakālaparśaddaiśikasāmagrī hi deśanāyāḥ kāraṇam iti nidānam āha | ekasmin samaya iti | śrutam ekasmin kāla iti pūrveṇa sambandhaḥ | etena sarvakālam evaṁvidhacintāratnarājasamasūtrapalambhābhāvāt kādācitkatvopadarśanena durlabhatvam asyākhyātam |

yad vaikasmin kāle mayedaṁ sūtraratnam śrutam anyadā 'nyad iti vakroktā svagatam bāhuśrutyaṁ sattvārtham prati kāruṇikavaidyārājanyāyenāha saṁgītikārah |

atha vaikasmin kṣaṇe sarvam śrutam ity arthaḥ | svapne devatādyādhipatyād alpīyasā 'pi kālena varṣaśatādyupalambhavad bhagavadādhipatyān nikhilasūtrārthā-vabhāsanāḥ samantarapratyayamanovijñānaprabhavaśrotravijñānasyaikasmin kṣaṇe samudbhavāt | anenātmanaḥ pramāṇapuruṣatām āha | yat kiṁcin mama śrotavyam tat sarvam ekasmin kṣaṇe mayā śrūyate 'cintyavimokṣamukhalābhivāt | na ca vismaryata iti | ata eva saṁgītikārasya paścāt krameṇa pravṛttīyām deśanāyām anyavineyajanavargānugrahārtham antarā sadāsamādhānāsambhavana kathāmicid

avyākṛtasya viṣayāntarāvalambinaś cetasaḥ sambhave 'pi nāvikale sūtre saṃgītīr  
uttarakālaṃ virudhyate | tathāgatādhipatyena sampūrṇanirbhāsavataḥ pratyayasā-  
dāv evopajātatvāt |

Derge Tanjur 3791, *shes phyin, cha* 6a1-6b1: de ltar gleng bslang byas nas | da ni  
gang gi tshe gang las gang du su zhig dang lhan cig khyod kyis 'di lta bu'i mdo sde  
rin po che thos zhes dris pa dang | bdag nyid tshad ma'i skyes bu'i bstan par bya ba'i  
phyir | lhan 'debs pas yul dang dus dang ston pa po dang 'khor phun sum tshogs pa  
ni ston par byed pa'i rgyu yin no zhes gleng gzhi gsungs pa ni | dus gcig na zhes bya  
ba ste | dus gcig gi tshe na thos so || zhes sngam dang sbyar ro || 'dis ni 'di lta bu'i  
yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che'i rgyal po lta bu'i mdo sde ni dus thams cad du thos  
mi srid pa'i phyir brgya lam na yin par bstan par bstan pa yin pas 'di rnyed par dka'  
ba nyid du bstan to ||

yang na sdus pa pos dus gcig gi tshe na bdag gis mdo sde 'di thos kyi | gzhan gi  
tshe na gzhan yin no zhes zur gyis smos pas 'gro ba'i don gyi phyir | snying rje can  
gyi sman pa'i rgyal po'i tshul du sdud pa po rang nyid mang du thos par brjod pa yin  
no ||

yang na skad cig ma gcig la thos so zhes bya ba'i don te | rmi lam du lha sogs  
pa'i mthus dus cung zhig la yang lo brgya la sogs par dmigs pa dang 'dra bar | bcom  
ldan 'das kyi byin gyis brlabs kyis mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen yid kyi rnam  
par shes pa las byung ba | mdo'i don ma lus pa snang ba can gyi rna ba'i rnam par  
shes pa ni skad cig ma gcig las byung ba'i phyir ro || 'dis ni rnam par thar pa'i sgo  
bsam gyis mi khyab pa thob pa'i phyir na | bdag gi mnyan par bya ba gang ji snyed  
pa de thams cad skad cig ma gcig la bdag gis thos shing | brjed pa yang med do zhes  
bdag nyid tshad ma'i skyes bu nyid yin par ston to || de nyid kyis na yang dag par  
sdud par byed pa gdul bya'i skye bo'i tshogs gzhan rjes su gzung ba'i don du | phyis  
rim gyis bstan pa la 'jug pa na | rtag tu mnyam par gzhag pa yod pa ma yin pas | ci  
zhig ltar bar du yul gzhan la dmigs pa'i sems lung du ma bstan pa 'byung du zin  
kyang | dus phyis mdo ma tshang ba med bar sdud pa ni mi 'gal te | de bzhin  
gshegs pa'i byin gyis brlabs pa'i yongs su rdzogs par snang ba dang ldan pa'i shes pa  
sngar skyes pa nyid yin pa'i phyir ro ||

<sup>50</sup> Following the Tib.; Skt. omits \**kadā*.

<sup>51</sup> Tib. "hearing."

<sup>52</sup> The (or one) source of this simile appears to be the *Ratnamegha-sūtra*, in which the context is a comparison of the Buddha to a physician. I quote here only the relevant simile itself (translated from Tibetan; all Chinese versions almost the same):

For example, Gentle son, there may be a knowledgeable physician, and beings oppressed by disease. He is the one and only physician in that place, yet no one knows his great abilities. Then the physician thinks: Alas!, these beings suffer, are oppressed by disease, and prone to illness, so I must cure them. And so thinking that physician himself speaks in praise of his own abilities, saying: "Beings, I am a physician, knowledgeable about diseases, knowledgeable about the causes of diseases, and knowledgeable about medicines." Then those beings become aware of the fact that he is a physician, and they trust him and rely on that physician. Then that physician cures those beings and eradicates their diseases.

Derge Kanjur 231, *mdo sde, wa*, 72a2-5: rigs kyi bu 'di lta ste | dper na sman pa mkhas pa zhig yod la | sems can rnams kyang nad kyis nyen par gyur | sa'i phyogs de na'ang sman pa gcig pur zad de gnyis su med la | de'i yon tan gyi che ba sus kyang mi shes pa dang | de nas sman pa de 'di snyam du sems te | kye ma'o sems can 'di dag ni sdug bsngal pa | nad kyis nyen pa | sman la mi mkhas pa | gnod pa la sten pa yin gyis | bdag gis de dag gso bar bya'o snyam nas | sman pa des sems can dag gi mdun du kye sems can dag bdag ni sman pa ste | nad la mkhas pa'o nad kyi gzhi la mkhas pa'o || sman la mkhas pa'o zhes bdag gi yon tan gyi bsngags pa bdag nyid kyis brjod pa dang | sems can de dag 'di ni sman pa'o zhes bya bar shes zhing yid ches par gyur nas sman pa de la rten to || de nas sman pa des sems can de dag gso zhing nad de zhi bar byed na |

Chinese versions are found in the *Foshuo baoyu-jing* 佛說寶雨經, T. 660 (XVI) 311a28-b5; *Baoyun jing* 寶雲經, T. 658 (XVI) 226c12-21; *Dacheng baoyun-jing* 大乘寶雲經, T. 659 (XVI) 261c26-262a7; and *Foshuo chugaizhang pusa suowen-jing* 佛說除蓋障菩薩所問經, T. 489 (XIV) 732b20-27.

<sup>53</sup> Kale 1896: 91 (IV.8). It should be noted that the word is cited already in Wilson's dictionary of 1819: 573b, s.v. *pramāṇa*, which has (in *nāgarī*, but hyphenation as I give it) *pramāṇaḥ-puruṣaḥ-pramāṇāstrī*, rendering "the man witness, the woman witness." I do not know upon what basis Wilson cites this, or whether the feminine form ever appears in literature. Monier-Williams's dictionary has the compound *pramāṇa-puruṣa* in its first edition of 1872, and in the "new edition" of 1899: 686a cites its source as *Hitopadeśa*. While not in Böhtlingk and Roth 1855–1875, the word is found in Böhtlingk 1879–1889: III.163c, without reference. I had overlooked the existence of this word in Sanskrit until the *Hitopadeśa* reference was brought to my attention by Mr. James Apple. Considering the extent to which the *Hitopadeśa* borrows material (see Sternbach 1960), we might expect to find a close parallel to this episode elsewhere, but so far I have failed to do so.

<sup>54</sup> As Johnson 1864: 110–111 observed, this story does not appear in every manuscript of the *Hitopadeśa*, and its style differs from the usual style of the text. Indeed, it is missing in the editions of both Schlegel and Lassen 1829 and Peterson 1887. I am not sure in fact upon what the inclusion of this story in the collection is based. The omission in Schlegel and Lassen is noted by Zachariae 1907: 349 (607), on the basis of an undated but "new" manuscript in Bengali script; Peterson seems unaware of the omission. I do not know whether textcritical work on the history of the *Hitopadeśa* and its recensions has been undertaken, after for example Hertel 1897, in which a few remarks on this issue are offered (but not so far as I noticed with reference to the story in question).

<sup>55</sup> See van Buitenen 1973: 393–398, translating *Ādiparvan* 201–204. The short version in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* Bk. 3 tar. 15.135–140 (Durgaprasād 1903; translated with notes in Penzer 1924: 13–14) also mentions no judge. Note also the *sundopasunda-nyāya* in Jacob 1925: 85, kindly brought to my attention by Tim Cahill.

<sup>56</sup> So Conze 1978: 122.

<sup>57</sup> Schiefner 1868: 162.8. See Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1980: 268, and Mitsuhara 1974: 47.

<sup>58</sup> Derge Tanjur 4010, *mdo 'grel, nyi* 2b1-5: da ni gang gi tshe gang las gang du gang dag dang lhan cig mdo sde rin po che dpe med pa 'di lta bu khyod kyis thos

zhes 'dri ba'i lan gdab pa'i phyir dang | rang nyid tshad mar bstan pa'i phyir sdud par byed pas yul la sogs pa bstan pa ni thos pa'i dus gcig na zhes bya ba la dus gcig na | 'di lta bu'i mdo sde rin po che 'di thos kyi gzhan gyi tshe ni gzhan thos so zhes bya bas ni sman pa'i rgyal po snying rje can bzhin du bdag nyid mang du thos pa yin par sdud pa pos bstan pa yin te | 'di lta bu'i mdo sde rin po che thams cad du thos pa yod pa yin no zhes bya ba'i bsam pas so || yang na dus gcig na zhes bya ba ni skad cig gcig la rmi lam du lha la sogs pa'i byin gyis brlabs kyis dus thung du la lo brgya la sogs pa dmigs pa lta bung [*read*: bur] chos kyi rgyun gyi ting nge 'dzin thob pa dang | de bzhin gshegs pa'i dang po'i dbang gis skad cig la thos pa mi brjed pa yin pa la ba med do zhes bya ba ni bsdus pa'i don yin no ||

Also translated in Mitsuhara 1974: 49.

<sup>59</sup> See above n. 52.

<sup>60</sup> Part of the reason I say this is that the pattern seen here in these two texts is actually much more widespread. I discuss this further in the study mentioned above in n. 43.

<sup>61</sup> On his identity and date see Faber 1989. Cp. also Sacco 1988.

<sup>62</sup> My translation owes much to Lopez 1996: 50. On the text see also Mochizuki 1991b: 61–65.

Derge Tanjur 3818, *shes phyin, ma* 268b7–269a1: rang mtshan [*read*: tshad] mar grub par bya ba'i phyir yul dang dus dang | 'khor dbang [*read*: dpang] du byed cing dbang [*read*: dpang] dang bcas par smras na | smra ba po tshad ma yin par khong du chud par 'gyur ro zhes che ba gang dag smra ba de ni bdag gis khong du ma chud de | 'di lta yul de dag tu song zing dpang rnam la 'dri na ni de nus pa med pa rnam kyis mdo'i don gtan la dbab pa thag ring bar 'gyur ro || yang ji lta mdo sde 'di bzhin du gang du 'khor gyi ming ma bstan pa de ji lta dpang zhes brjed par bya |

<sup>63</sup> Derge Tanjur 3814, *shes phyin, ma* 10b1–3: gang yang rang tshad mar grub par bya ba'i phyir | yul dang dus ni gtan tshigs | 'khor ni dpang po yin te | rtsod pa'i dpang rgya dang tshul 'dra'o zhes smra na | de ni bdag gis rtogs pa ma yin te | 'di lta yul thog thag tu song zhing dpang la dri bar bya na ni der 'gro mi nus pa rnam kyis mdo sde'i don gtan la dbab pa ring du thogs par 'gyur ro || gang du 'khor gyi ming ma bstan pa der yang su la dri bar bya |

I found helpful the translation of Lopez 1996: 22.

<sup>64</sup> A proper understanding of this discussion requires one to recognize the reference to certain key concepts in Indian law, namely the definitions of a witness, evidence or proof, and contract. This was obviously not lost on the Tibetan translators of the text, who distinguish here between *tshad ma* as *pramāṇa* in its Buddhist technical sense, and *gtan tshigs* as *pramāṇa* in the legal technical sense of “evidence” (and not its more common use as a rendering of *betu*). The latter translation is attested in the dictionary of Tse ring dbang rgyal (Bacot 1930: folio 64b). For a discussion based on the Dharma literature, see Kane 1968–1977: III.306ff., and on witnesses III.330–360.

<sup>65</sup> Ruegg 1981: 111.

<sup>66</sup> On this commentary, see Mochizuki 1991a, and 1991b: 57–61. For another translation see Lopez 1996: 71.

Derge Tanjur 3823, *shes phyin, ma*, 313b1–314a1: de yang sngon byung ba dang | rjes 'jug ste | gleng bslang ba'o || gleng zhi la gnyis te | thun mong dang khyad

par gyi gleng gzhi'o || 'di gnyis kyi bye brag ni mdo thams cad la thun mong du  
yod pa dang | mdo 'di la yod ba gzhan la med pa'o || thun mong la bzhi ste | dus  
dang ston pa dang | gnas dang 'khor ro || khyad par gyi gleng gzhi la gnyis te |  
gtso bo dang 'khor ting nge 'dzin la zhugs pa'o || de ni bsdus don no || dgos ba'i  
don ni sdud pa po rang nyid tshad ma'i skyes bur 'gyur bar bya ba'i phyir te | dus de  
tsam na ston pa 'di la 'khor 'di rnams dang gnas 'dir thos so zhes dbang [*read:*  
dpang] po dang dan rtags [*read:* don rtogs] dang bcas pa'i tshig brjod na | 'o na 'di  
bshad pa 'di bden no zhes sdud pa po la yid ches par 'gyur te | 'di lta ste | 'jig rten  
na yang dbang [*read:* dpang] dang don rtogs zhib pas kho'i de bden no zhes rtogs pa  
bzhin no || de skad du yang slob dpon phyogs kyi glang bos |

dad ldan 'jug pa'i yan lag tu || rang nyid tshad mar rab bsgrub phyir ||  
ston pa dang ni 'khor dbang [*read:* dpang] po || yul dang dus sogs bstan pa yin  
||

sdud par byed pas 'jig rten du || yul dang dus sogs bstan pa ni ||  
dpang por bcas pa'i tshig brjod na || rang nyid tshad mar 'gro ba yin ||

zhes gsungs so || 'di rnams kyi tshig don dang tshig rnam par sbyar ba ni gsal lo ||  
des na mdo thams cad de ltar bshad par bya ba yin par brgyad stong pa'i bsdus don  
na bstan to || lhag ma ni mthun no || 'dir dri ma med pa'i bshes gnyen gyis de  
bkag ste | rang gi lugs gsal bar byed pa la dang po sun 'byin te | de la skyon gnyis te  
| mi nus pa dang dbang [*read:* dpang] por mi 'gyur ba'o ||

de la mi nus pa ni dgos pa de sgrub par mi nus ba ste | da lta ni dad pas rjes su  
'brang ba rnams 'jug pa'i yan lag tu rang tshad ma'i skyes bur bsgrub pa'i phyir de  
smos so || dpang po'i dgos pa yang phyis de la the tshom zab la sogs pa byung tsam  
na | de la thug pa yin la | de ltar na rdzu 'phrul dang mngon par shes pa thob pa  
rnams kyi mdo'i don gtan la 'bebs pa mi srid par 'gyur te | dpang po 'ga' zhis ni  
mya ngan las 'das la | kha cig gzhan bzhugs pa ste |

<sup>67</sup> Thus if the reference is to the Heart Sūtra; but it may be more general, as pointed out by Kaie Mochizuki (personal communication, 3 April, 2000).

<sup>68</sup> These are verses 3 and 4 of Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitāpinḍārthasamgraha*. However, Atiśa's quotation differs somewhat from that in the canonical version of Dignāga's text; my translation follows Atiśa's version here. Dignāga's text is preserved in Sanskrit: Frauwallner 1959: 140; Tucci 1947: 56:

śraddhāvatām pravṛtṭyaṅgam śāstā parṣac ca sākṣiṇī |  
deśakālau ca nirdiṣṭau svaprāmāṇyaprasiddhaye || 3  
saṃgītikartrā loke hi deśakālopalakṣitam |  
sasākṣikam vadan vaktā prāmāṇyam adhigacchati || 4

Derge Tanjur 3809, *shes phyin, pha*, 292b5-6 (and Tucci 1947: 68, with many errors):

dad ldan 'jug pa'i yan lag tu || ston pa dpang po 'khor dang ni ||  
yul dus dag kyang nges bstan pa || sdud po rang nyid tshad mar ni || 3  
rab grub phyir yin 'jig rten na || yul dang dus kyi nyer mtshon zhing ||  
dpang por bcas pa smra ba yi || smra po tshad mar rjes su rtogs || 4

We may translate Dignāga's text as follows:

In order to establish his own authority (*prāmāṇya*) the complier indicates the Teacher as the component element which brings about the active engagement of those possessed of faith, as well as the assembly which acts as witness, and the place, time, and so on, since [here] in the world a speaker attains [his] authority

[by] mentioning that he has witnesses characterized by reference to place and time.

The best study of Dignāga's text is Hattori 1961.

<sup>69</sup> Derge Tanjur 3948, *dbu ma kbi* 250a5-b1; Peking Tanjur 5345, *dbu ma, kbi* 288a8-b3: 'di ltar sngon gyi mkhas pa chen po de dag gi lugs thams cad 'dir bkod par gyur na ni gzhung shin tu mangs par 'gyur ro || slob dpon chen po de rnams ni theg pa chen po'i lam la tshad ma'i skyes bur gyur pa | byams pa chen po dang snying rje chen po la goms pa | byang chub kyi sems rnam pa gnyis [P: gnyas] la thugs brtan pa'o || de la slob dpon kha cig gis phyag rgya chen po'i dngos grub brnyes pa'o || la las ni bden ba gzigs pa'o || la las ni 'jig rten chos mchog chen po brnyes nas sprul pa'i sku las gdams ngag thob pa dag yin pa dang | mdo nyid na yang de dag ji ltar bzhed pa bzhin du bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs pas | de dag ni lam chen po nyid yin no zhes khong du chud par bya'o ||

The passage has been translated a bit differently in Sherburne 1983: 45, to whose work however I am indebted.

<sup>70</sup> The reference is clarified by Atiśa a bit later in the text (Derge Tanjur 3948, *dbu ma, kbi* 257b4-5, Peking Tanjur 5345, *dbu ma, kbi* 297a3; Sherburne 1983: 60) when he quotes the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Bendall 1897-1902: 8.15-16; MS Cambridge Add. 1478 6a3): tac ca bodhicittaṃ dvidvidhaṃ bodhipraṇidhicittaṃ ca bodhiprasthānacittaṃ ca, "And that aspiration to awakening is of two types, the vowing to attain awakening, and the actually setting forth [in the path] toward awakening." The same is found in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* I.15 (La Vallée Poussin 1901-1914: 23): tad-bodhicittaṃ dvidvidhaṃ vijñātavyaṃ samāsataḥ | bodhipraṇidhicittaṃ ca bodhiprasthānam eva ca ||

<sup>71</sup> Derge Tanjur 3948, *dbu ma, kbi* 249b3-4; Peking Tanjur 5345, *dbu ma, kbi* 297b3-4; Sherburne 1983: 44.

<sup>72</sup> On the authorship of this text, and the author's name, see Isoda 1988 and Skilling 1997. The colophon is edited and translated by Skilling 1997: 191-192, and see 188, 190 for the dates. A portion of the colophon was already translated in Cordier 1915: 278

<sup>73</sup> The verse is found in Sanskrit in Amano 1989: 2 = 2000: 3: jagatsaṅgakṛtā-saṅgenāryāsaṅgena tāyinā | kṛtā vyākhyā mahāśāstre śrutvā nāthājitāt svayaṃ ||

<sup>74</sup> Derge Tanjur 3794, *shes phyin, ja*, 141a5-b2; Peking Tanjur 5192 *sher phyin, ja* 162a7-b3: ci dpyad pas sam thos pa gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pas mdzad dam zhe na | ma yin de [P: te] nyid kyis | [P: ø |] *mi pham mgon las gsan nas ni* || [P: ø |] zhes smos pa yin te | lha dang mi rnams kyi dam par gyur pa yin pa'i phyir dang | 'jig rten gyi gtso bor gyur pa nyid kyis na dbang phyug chen po la sogs pas mi thub pa'i phyir mi pham [P: 'pham] mo zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid kyis gsan nas legs par bsams shing bsgoms pas bstan par byas nas zhes bya bar don gyis [P: gyi] shes so || 'di ni ting nge 'dzin brnyes pa nyid yin na yang ji ltar lhag par mos pas tshig le'ur byas pas mdzad pa po las mngon sum du gsan pa nyid yin pas sdud pa po dang 'dra bar 'dir tshad ma'i skyes bur gyur pa yin la | 'dir gzhan dag thos pa mang ba yang yin zhing dran pa yang shes pa bzhin bsdu pa byas pa nyid ni 'dir ci zhis ltar 'grel pa byed pa la dbang ba yin na | mkhas par rlom pa gzhan dag lta smos kyang ci dgos zhes bya bar dgongs so ||

<sup>75</sup> Bu ston in his *Chos 'byung* (Lokesh Chandra 1971: folio 105a4–5) quotes the opening verse of the \**Yogācār(y)abhūmivṛyākhyā*, Tōh. 4043, Derge Tanjur, *sems tsam*, 'i, 69a1–2: 'jig rten kun la phan phyir thogs med ces bya ba [D: bas] || chos rgyun ting 'dzin stobs kyis drangs pa bdun rtsi'i chos || 'phags pa mi pham zhal gyi bum pa nas blugs pa || gsan pa'i snyim pas gsol pa de la phyag 'tshal lo ||. Obermiller 1932b: II.141 translates: “I make my salutations to him who is called Asaṅga, / Who for the sake of helping the living beings, / Has secured, by the force of the Dharmasrotah-samādhi, / The nectar of the Highest Doctrine that poured forth / From that precious vessel,—the mouth of the Saint Maitreya, / And has drunk it by means of his ears.” Cf. *Yuqieashidilun-sbi* 瑜伽師地論釋 T. 1580 (XXX) 883a8–14.

The question of the relation between Maitreya and Asaṅga and the authorship of texts attributed to Maitreya is much discussed in both traditional Buddhist and modern scholarship. The remarks of \*Dharmakīrtīśrī here are to be understood in this context. We may note that Bu ston refers to Maitreya as a *saṃgītikāra* in his *Chos 'byung* (Lokesh Chandra 1971: folio 90b4–5 = Obermiller 1932b: II.101), as pointed out by Ruegg 1969: 44, who states this to follow the opinion of Abhayākaragupta. However, the passage upon which this seems to be based (that quoted by Bu ston at Lokesh Chandra 1971: folio 104b2 = Obermiller 1932b: II. 139 from Abhayākaragupta's *Ārya-Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāvṛtti Marmakaumita*, Derge Tanjur 3805, *shes phyin, da* 2b5–7) does not use the term *saṃgītikāra*. Moreover, in \*Dharmakīrtīśrī's discussion here it seems to be (the unspecified) Asaṅga who is treated as the compiler of the teachings of Maitreya, not Maitreya himself who is thought of as a *saṃgītikāra*.

<sup>76</sup> I confess I do not understand the last sentence well at all.

<sup>77</sup> According to the colophon, the commentary was composed in the Vihāra of Khyad par mkhar sku, situated between the Yellow river and Wu-tai-shan, in the Mi nyag country (Tangut kingdom), and it was translated into Tibetan by the author and Kun dga' grags. See the detailed discussion of Jayānanda in van der Kuijp 1994 (earlier Cordier 1915: 306, for the colophon, and Ruegg 1981: 114). van der Kuijp 1994: 193 notes that a fifteenth century Tibetan author, Gser mdog Paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan, states that Jayānanda wrote the commentary in Tibet, not in the Tangut country. Whatever the case may be, the work should perhaps not be considered an Indian text as such.

<sup>78</sup> Colophon in Cordier 1915: 331. See also Naudou 1980: 234–235.

<sup>79</sup> Derge Tanjur 3862, *dbu ma*, 'a 248a4–5; La Vallée Poussin 1907–1912: 85.17–20: de'i phyir de ltar de nyid rtogs [LVP: rtog] par 'dod pa'i lugs gzhan du brtag [LVP: brtags] pa'i bdag las skye ba bzlog nas lugs gzhan du blo ma sbyangs pa'i 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du yang rtog pa 'di mi 'thad [LVP: thad] do zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa |

Translated in La Vallée Poussin 1910: 282–283, and with additional comments from the *ṭīkā* (but not an integral translation) Ogawa 1976: 56–57. For his great help with this and the following passage I extend my thanks to Shōryū Katsura.

<sup>80</sup> Derge Tanjur 3870, *dbu ma*, ra 125b1–5: de ltar rang las skye bar mi rigs pa'i gnod pa bstan nas | 'jig rten pa'i gnod pa bstan par bya ba'i phyir | de ltar zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | de nyid rtogs par 'dod pa'i lugs gzhan du brtags pa'i zhes bya ba ni de kho na nyid mngon sum du byed par 'dod pas ni de nyid rtogs par 'dod pa

ste | mu stegs pa rnamso | de nyid kyi phyir | 'dod pa zhes bya ba smos te | rnyed pa ma yin no zhes pa'o || lugs gzhan zhes bya ba ni grangs can pa la sogs pa'i 'dod pa'o || des brtags pa ni blos brtags pa yin gyi dngos po ni yod pa ma yin no zhes pa'o || bzlog nas zhes bya ba ni rigs pa'i sgo nas so || lugs gzhan du blo ma sbyangs pa'i 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du yang zhes bya ba ni grub pa'i mtha' la mi ltos pa'i phyir lugs gzhan du blo [*insert: ma*] sbyangs pa ste 'jig rten gyi tha snyad brgyud pas [*insert: ma*] sbyangs pas 'jig rten gyi blo gang yin pa de'i tha snyad kyis so || rtog pa 'di zhes bya ba ni rang las skye ba gang yin pa'o || 'jig rten pa'i tshad ma'i skyes bu'i 'dod pas kyang rang las skye bar ni mi 'grub la | tha mal pa'i skyes bu ni 'jig rten na yang tshad ma nyid du mi 'dod pas so || de'i phyir blo [*insert: ma*] sbyangs pa zhes bya ba smos pa yin no ||

<sup>81</sup> van der Kuijp 1999: 647. In 1987: 57 van der Kuijp suggested that “in all probability [*tshad ma'i skyes bu is*] a contraction of *tshad ma'i gyur pa'i skyes bu.*”

<sup>82</sup> This seems to me to be an entirely different claim from the very reasonable one made by Ruegg 1994a: 418: “Soulignons ... que si chez Dignāga l'épithète *pramāṇabbūta* se réfère au Bhagavant=Buddha tandis que chez Patañjali, et plus tard chez Candrakīrti, elle concerne un Ācārya, la notion désignée par cette épithète est un précurseur de *tshad ma'i skyes bu* = \**pramāṇapurusa.*”

<sup>83</sup> Ruegg 1994b: 303–304; 1994a: 411. The reference in Ruegg 1995: 819, n. 4 suggesting that the term appears in *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.2—that is, in the root text itself—seems to be an oversight or printer's error; it appears in the auto-commentary to the verse (and is, thus, anyway contemporaneous).

<sup>84</sup> Derge Tanjur 3862, *dbu ma*, 'a 245a1–2; La Vallée Poussin 1907–1912: 75.14–20: bstan bcos tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus byas shing lung phyin ci ma log par 'chad pa mthong ba las lung gi dgongs pa nges pas ni | ji ltar de yis chos zab chos rtogs pa || lung dang gzhan yang rigs pas yin pas na || de ltar 'phags pa klu sgrub gzhang lugs las | ji ltar gnas pa'i lugs bzhin brjod par bya |

<sup>85</sup> I quote the translation of the verse from Huntington 1989: 157. The *Madhyamakāvātāra* passage and its *bhāṣya* are found translated in La Vallée Poussin 1910: 274, and with additional comments from the *ṭīkā* (almost an integral translation) in Ogawa 1976: 24 (see the next note).

<sup>86</sup> Ruegg quotes the passage partially in 1994b: 304, n. 5. Derge Tanjur 3870, *dbu ma, ra* 112a5–7: gal te tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus byas pa'i bstan bcos lung phyin ci ma log par 'chad par mthong ba med na rang dbang nyid kyi lung gi dgongs pa nges par dka' ba yin no zhes brjod pa yin no || da ni tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus byas pa'i bstan bcos lung phyin ci ma log par 'chad pa mthong ba las lung gi dgongs pa phyin ci ma log par nges pa yin no zhes rang nyid bzhed pa'i phyogs ston pa ni | tshad mar gyur pa'i zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te | tshad mar gyur pa yang yin la | skyes bu yang yin pas na tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu ste | 'phags pa klu sgrub zhabs la sogs pa'o || de rnamso kyis byas pa'i bstan bcos te | dbu ma la rtas ba'i shes rab la sogs pa'o ||

<sup>87</sup> I ignore here the controversy over the proper form of his name, and use Bhāvaviveka because of its general familiarity. At the same time, we may note that there seems to be a growing consensus that the form Bhāviveka is preferable. It is a bit less easy to pass over the problem of the authorship of the *Tarkajvālā*. While there does not seem to be a question that the text is essentially the auto-comment-

ary to the sixth century Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakabṛdayakārikā*, Ejima 1980: 13–15 questions whether the Tibetan translation of the *Tarkajvālā* as we have it accurately reflects that text. He suggests that there are in fact numerous changes and additions found in this version. (He also raises the possibility—which I cannot explore here—that the *Tarkajvālā* as we have it is to be assigned rather to the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*; Ejima 1980: 35–36, n. 19). One possible implication of Ejima's hypothesis for the present discussion might be that the occurrence of *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu* here is an addition by Atiśa, rather than an accurate representation of some term which stood in the Indic original attributed to Bhāvaviveka. However, in the context of the hypothesis set forth in the present paper, this may not in the end be a significant distinction. See also Ejima 1991, and note that Qvarnström 1989: 21, n. 1, for example, rejects any suggestion of a different authorship for the *Tarkajvālā*.

<sup>88</sup> Derge Tanjur 3856, *dbu ma, dza* 274b4–275a1, Peking Tanjur 5256, *dbu ma, dza* 310a7–b2 (the latter courtesy of David Eckel): gang grangs can pa dang | bye brag pa dang | gcer bu pa dang | med par smra ba pa dang | sangs rgyas pa [D: ø] la sogs pa rnam kyi ser skya dang | gzegs can [P: zan] dang | gcer bu dang | 'jig rten 'di pa dang | sangs rgyas la sogs pa rnam ni tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu nyid yin no zhes bstan pa de ni mi rigs te | gang gi phyir |

chags sogs skyon gyis nyams pa'i phyir || skyes bu'i tshig ni brdzun nyid yin || rig byed skyes bus ma byas phyir || des na tshad mar gsung bar bya ||

skyes bu rnam ni 'dod chags la sogs pa dag dang | ma rig pa'i rjes su 'gro ba yin pa'i phyir | don gzhan du rnam par gnas la gzhan du sgrub par byed pa yin te | dper na chu klung 'di'i 'gram na 'bras bu gnas so zhes bya ba ni bden par yang 'gyur la brgya la ni bden par yang 'gyur la brgya la ni mi bden par yang 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i lung bzhin no\* || gal te skyes bu'i tshig tshad ma ma yin na | tshad mar gyur pa gang zhig yin zhe na | rang byung ba'i rig byed tshad mar gyur pa yin te || skyes bus ma byas pa'i phyir ro || 'di skyes bus ma byas pa nyid ji lta bu yin zhe na | byed po mi dran par 'dod phyir || rig byed skyes bus ma byas la || brgyud nas 'ongs pa ma chad phyir || des na lung yin de med na ||

\* This sentence seems to be corrupt in both Derge and Peking, Derge having dropped too much, Peking added too much. *Derge*: dper na chu klung 'di'i 'gram na 'bras bu gnas so zhes bya ba ni bden par yang 'gyur la brgya la ni bden par yang 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i lung bzhin no. *Peking*: dper na chu klung 'di'i 'gram na 'bras bu gnas so zhes bya ba ni bden par yang 'gyur la brgya la ni bden par yang 'gyur ro zhes bya ba ni brgya la ni bden par yang 'gyur la brgya la ni mi bden par yang 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i lung bzhin no.

The Sanskrit verses from the *Madhyamakabṛdayakārikā* are quoted in Kawasaki 1973: 72–73 = 1976: 4, 6 = 1992: 407–408, and Lindtner 1997: 95–96:

rāgādidoṣaduṣṭatvāt puruṣasya vaco mṛṣā |  
vedo 'puruṣakartṛtvāt pramāṇam iti gr̥hyate || 3  
kartur asmarāṇāc ceṣṭo vedo 'puruṣakartṛkaḥ |  
sampradāyānupacchedād āgamo 'sau tadatyaye || 4

<sup>89</sup> In this and the following there seems to be a sort of double usage of the term *pramāṇa*, both in the sense of authority but also in the extended sense of source of valid knowledge.

<sup>90</sup> The same idea is found a number of times in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* and Kamalaśīla's commentary thereon, in which chapter 24 (according to the Sanskrit text; the Tibetan translation divides things differently) deals with the Mīmāṃsā position. The *pūrvapakṣa* begins with Śāntarakṣita's verse 2084, to which Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* reads in part (Shastri 1982: 712.10-12): puruṣasya rāgādibhir avidyā ca paritacetaso vacanaṃ nālamatīndriyam artham aviparītam avagamayitum | atas tadvacanasamadhigamyo na dharmādih |. See also *Tattvasaṅgraha* 2370 (Shastri 1982: 790.11-12):

mohamānādibhir doṣair ato 'mī viplutāḥ śruteḥ |  
viparītām api vyākhyāṃ kuryur ity abhīśaṅkyate ||

Again, *Tattvasaṅgraha* 2085 (Shastri 1982: 714.1-2) reads:

sā hi pramāṇaṃ sarveṣāṃ narākṛtatayā sthitā |  
vaitathyaṃ pratipadyante pauruṣeyo giro yataḥ ||

Here the commentary includes the following (Shastri 1982: 714.11-14): ity āha narākṛtatayeti | apauruṣeyatvāt | anenāvitathajñānahetutvaṃ vaitathyakāraṇarāgādi-doṣagaṇābhāvena pratipādayati | prayogaḥ yan mithyātvahetudoṣasaṃsargarahitaṃ tad avitathajñānakāraṇaṃ yathā timirādidoṣānupaplutaṃ cakṣuḥ mithyātvahetu-rāgādidoṣasaṃsargarahitaś cāpauruṣeyatvād veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ |

Again, *Tattvasaṅgraha* 2336 (Shastri 1982: 782.6-783.1) reads:

api cāsyā kathāvat tu saṅghātāt pauruṣeyatā |  
na cāptaḥ puruṣo 'trāsti tena vedāpramāṇatā ||

Here Kamalaśīla writes (Shastri 1982: 782.24-783.12): tataś ca pauruṣeyatvād rathyāpuruṣavākyavadapramāṇaṃ vedaḥ syāt | āptapraṇītātvat pauruṣeyo 'pi pramāṇaṃ bhaviṣyatīti ced | āha na cāpta ityādi ||

<sup>91</sup> Here I more or less follow the lead of Kawasaki 1976: 5, n. 6, who translated "This statement tries to prove one thing on the basis of another unconnected thing. For instance, as for the statement 'On the bank of this river, there grows fruit,' in a hundred cases this statement is valid, whereas in another hundred cases it is not." Kawasaki states that he has followed the Peking edition; however, I think he must have read the text essentially as I emend it above.

<sup>92</sup> Actually the verse concludes: "Were that [Veda] to disappear," then continuing in verse 5.

In Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* ad *Tattvasaṅgraha* 2342, in the context of a discussion concerning the existence of an author of the Veda, in response to the comparison that Vyāsa, the "author" *karṭṛ* of the *Mahābhārata* is remembered, the Mīmāṃsāka states (Shastri 1982: 784.9): vede tu na smṛtiḥ. Compare Kumārila's *Mīmāṃsā-Ślokaṅgī* (Rāmaśāstri Tailāṅga 1898-1899: 949.3-4) Vākyādhi-karaṇaṃ 367:

bhārate 'pi bhaved evaṃ karṭṛsmṛtyā tu bādhyate |  
vede 'pi tatsmṛtir yā sā 'rthavādanibandhanā ||

Concerning the unbroken line of teachers, *Tattvasaṅgraha* 2349 (Shastri 1982: 785.7-8) reads:

pramāṇe 'vasthite vede śiṣyācāryaparamparā |  
anādih kalpyamānā 'pi na doṣatvāya kalpate ||

See here also Kamalaśīla ad verse 2376.

<sup>93</sup> Derge Tanjur 3856, *dbu ma*, *dza* 279b5-280a1: 'jig rten na skyes bu gang dag gi tshig la the tshom za bar 'gyur ba yang yod de | ji ltar chu ngogs 'di na 'bras bu yod

do zhes zer la | brgya la ni yod kyang srid || brgya la ni med kyang srid pa lta bu'o  
 || yang gang dag gi tshig la the tshom za bar mi 'gyur ba yang yod de | 'jig rten  
 thams cad la tshad mar gyur pa yin pa'i phyir ji ltar gser la sogs pa rtog shes pa  
 bzhin no || des na gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid yin par nges par gzung bar bya ste |  
 skyes bu yin pa'i phyir | ci chu klung gi 'gram na 'bras bu yod do zhes smra bar  
 byed pa'i skyes bu'i tshig tshad ma ma yin pa lta bu zhig yin nam | 'on te gser rtog  
 shes pa'i skyes bu la sogs pa'i tshig bzhin du 'di'i tshig tshad mar gyur pa nyid gcig  
 yin zhes bya ba de lta bu ni ma nges pa nyid yin no ||

*Madhyamakḥṛdayakārikā* IX.23, in Kawasaki 1986: 4 = 1992: 413, and Lindtner  
 1997: 98:

nṛvāk ced doṣaduṣṭatvād apramāṇam itīṣyate |  
 sauvarṇikādivākyena hetuḥ syād vyabhicāravān ||  
 skyes bu'i tshig gi skyon bcas phyir || tshad ma min par 'dod ce na ||  
 gser rtog shes sogs tshig rnam kyī || gtan tshigs nyid ni ma nges 'gyur ||  
 In fact the discussion continues in the following verses and accompanying

commentary, but the most relevant portion is that quoted.

<sup>94</sup> The argument is then *anaikāntika*, that is, the logical reason for the mistake is  
 the inconclusiveness of the reason, which could be either supported or contradicted  
 by examples.

<sup>95</sup> *Tattvasaṅgraha* 2365-2367 (Shastri 1982: 790):

na hi tāvat sthito 'py eṣa jñānaṁ vedaḥ karoti naḥ |  
 yāvan na puruṣair eṣa dīpabhūtaiḥ prakāśitāḥ ||  
 tataś cāpauruṣeyatvaṁ bhūtārthajñānakāraṇam |  
 na kalpyaṁ jñānam etad dhi puṁvyākhyānāt pravarttate ||  
 saty apy eṣā nīrarthā 'to vedasyāpauruṣeyatā |  
 yad iṣṭaṁ phalam asyā hi jñānaṁ tat puruṣāśritam ||

Derge Tanjur 4266 *tshad ma*, ze 86a6-7:

ji srid skyes bu rnam kyis te || mar me 'gyur bas gsal byas min ||  
 de srid rig byed du gnas pas || khyed la shes pa skyed byed min ||  
 gang phyir shes pa de yi rgyu || skyes bu'i shes pa las 'byung 'gyur ||  
 des na skyes bus ma byas nyid || yang dag don shes rgyun mi rtag ||  
 skyes bus ma byas pa nyid de || rig byed la yod kyang don med ||  
 'di yi 'dod pa'i 'bras bu gang || de shes skyes bu la brten 'byung ||

<sup>96</sup> Shastri 1982: 790: yathārthajñānārtham asyāpauruṣeyatā kalpyate | sā ca kalpanā  
 'pi na puruṣanirapekṣā tajñānotpādane samartheti vyarthā tatkalpanā | puruṣā eva  
 pramaṇabhūtaḥ praṇetāro yathārthajñānakāraṇam santu | kim idānim  
 apauruṣeyatayā siddhopasthāyinyā ||

Derge Tanjur 4267, *tshad ma*, 'e 167a6-7: don ji lta ba bzhin du shes par bya ba'i  
 phyir 'di skyes bus ma byas pa nyid du brtags na | de brtags na yang skyes bu la ltos  
 pa med par de'i shes pa skyed par byed par mi nus pa'i phyir de brtags pa don med  
 pa yin no || 'chad pa po tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu nyid don ji lta ba bzhin shes  
 pa'i rgyu yin gyi da ni grub zin pa nye bar 'jig [*read*: 'jog] pa'i skyes bus ma byas pas  
 ci zhig bya |

<sup>97</sup> Ruegg 1995: 825.

<sup>98</sup> Ruegg 1995: 825-826.

<sup>99</sup> A passage in the *Ekottarikāgama* (T. 125 (35.5) (II) 746c15-19), however, asserts Ānanda's deep understanding of the Buddha's preaching:

And why is the monk Ānanda superior to former attendants? In past times the attendants of all buddhas listened to what others said and then understood it. But these days the monk Ānanda already understands even before the Tathāgata speaks. Even what the Tathāgata does not say he knows thoroughly. For this reason the monk Ānanda is superior to the attendants of all former buddhas. I have not come across any notice of this passage in Indian Buddhist śāstric literature.

<sup>100</sup> Lévi 1907: 138: *prāmāṇiko 'rtho yaḥ pramāṇabhūtena nīto vibhaktaḥ śāstrā vā tatpramāṇīkrtena vā*. Derge Tanjur 4026, *sems tsam, phi*, 223b6-7: de la tshad ma dang ldan pa'i don ni ston pa tshad mar gyur pa'am | des tshad mar mdzad pas nges par byas shing rnam par bye ba gang yin pa'o ||. My translation owes much to Ruegg 1994b: 306 = 1995: 821.

<sup>101</sup> Ruegg 1994b: 306-307 = 1995: 821-822. At 1995: 822, Ruegg says "As for teachers who are *pramāṇīkrta* (*tshad mar byas pa*, *tshad mar b'zag pa*) by the Buddha, according to Sthiramati ...." However, as far as I can see, no equivalent for *pramāṇīkrta* actually appears in Sthiramati's comment.

<sup>102</sup> Derge Tanjur 4034, *sems tsam, tsi*, 95b7-96a2: tshad mar gyur pas bshad pa'i don || zhes bya ba la | mdo sde la yang rnam pa gnyis te | nges pa'i don gyi mdo sde dang | bkri ba'i don gyi mdo sde'o || de la tshad mar gyur pa ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das lta bu'am | sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyi [*read: kyis?*] tshad mar gyur pa'i gang zag byang chub sems dpa' 'am | nyan thos chen po'am | de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan pa slob dpon klu sgrub la sogs pa lta bus gnyis su med par bshad pa'i don la rton pa ni tshad mar gyur pas bshad pa'i don la rton pa zhes bya ste | 'dis ni nges pa'i don gyi mdo sde la rton gyi bkri ba'i don gyi mdo sde la mi rton pa bstan te | phung po dang kham la sogs pa yod par bshad pa la mi rton pa'i phyir ro ||

<sup>103</sup> I do not know quite whether we should understand *tshad mar gyur pa'i gang zag* as something like *\*pramāṇabhūtapudgala*; I have not seen this Tibetan term elsewhere, and no such Sanskrit form is attested.

<sup>104</sup> It may be preferable to render "a bodhisattva or a great auditor who is an individual [made into] an authority by a buddha-blessed one"; the Tibetan allows either understanding.

<sup>105</sup> See above for a passage from Jayānanda in which Nāgārjuna is referred to in very much the same terms.

<sup>106</sup> In other words, such a realist (for example Sarvāstivāda) viewpoint belongs to the *neyārtha* scriptures, as such does not convey the ultimate truth, and thus is not to be relied upon.

<sup>107</sup> According to the colophon (Cordier 1915: 278), the translation is due to Vidyākara-prabha and Dpal brtsegs (placed by Ruegg 1981: 99 around the year 800), revised by Śrī Amaragomin, Blo ldan shes rab, and others.

<sup>108</sup> Amano 1987: 41.14-16 = 2000: 38.2-4: *pramuditādhūmav asthānaṃ vistareṇa yathāvan nirdiṣṭam ity ākārair yasmāt tathāgatena bodhim abhisambudhya dharmmā nopalabdā iti pramāṇapuruṣādarśanakāraṇopapannair |*

Derge Tanjur 3793, *shes phyin, ja* 96a7–b1 (and Amano 1975: 87.26–30, who quotes Narthang and Peking variants): gang gi phyir de bzhin gshegs pas byang chub mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas chos rnams ma gzigs pa zhes bya ba tshad ma'i skyes bus\* ma\*\* dmigs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi\*\*\* 'thad pas | sa rab tu dga' ba la sogs pa la mi gnas pa rgyas par ji skad du bstan pa zhes bya ba'i rnam pa de rnams kyis |

\* NP: bu \*\* Amano: mi \*\*\* NP: kyis

Compare the translation in Naughton 1991: 58.

<sup>109</sup> Derge Tanjur 3796 *shes phyin, nya* 57b2; Peking Tanjur 5194 *shes phyin, nya* 66a4–5: tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus ma [P: mi] gzigs pa'i rgyu 'thad pa dag gis zhes bya ba 'dis ni lung gi tshad ma ston te | da byang chub kyi snying po la 'dug pas ni chos gang yang skye ba 'am 'gag pa ma mthong ngo zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i gzhung gis so ||

Dharmamitra probably belongs to the first half of the ninth century, and the Tibetan translation of his work is attributed to Abhiyukta Tāraśrīmitra and Chos kyi shes rab (colophon in Cordier 1915: 279), which places it in the second half of the eleventh century; see van der Kuijp 1999: 648, and 1994: 376. For the date of Dharmamitra see also Ruegg 1981: 102, and for a discussion of his thought 1977. For a list of the numerous quotations of sūtra and śāstra in Dharmamitra's work, see Isoda 1987: 258–253 = 11–16.

I owe the reference to this passage to Mr. James Apple, although it was also partially quoted by van der Kuijp 1994: 376, n. 2.

<sup>110</sup> On the relation between the two commentaries, see Amano 1988, who concludes that the *Vivṛti* precedes the *Āloka*, and not as Obermiller (1933: viii) suggested that the former is an abridgement of the latter.

<sup>111</sup> Wogihara 1932–1935: 153.1–2: evaṃ hi śikṣamāṇo bodhisattvo mahāsattvo viharaty anena prajñāpāramitāvihāreṇāvīrahitaś cānena manasikāreṇeti |

Derge Kanjur 12, *brgyad stong pa, ka* 22a3–4: de ltar slob pa'i byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i gnas pa 'dis gnas shing yid la byed pa 'di dang ma bral ba yin no ||

<sup>112</sup> My understanding of this passage is deeply—even almost entirely—indebted to Obermiller 1936: 211–212. Obermiller's utter clarity of expression in his stupendous work on the *Abhisamayālamkāra*, published 65 years ago, should have put more recent scholars like Conze to shame.

Wogihara 1932–1935: 153.3–10; Tucci 1932: 137.19–138.3: tataḥ kiṃ bhavatīty āha | evaṃ hītyādi | evaṃ bhāvanādhigatāgradharmātmakena prajñāpāramitāvihāreṇa viharati | ata eva cāvīrahito 'nena manasikāreṇa bhavati | itīśabdaḥ prakaraṇa-samāptyarthaḥ | tad ayaṃ vākyārthaḥ | yasmāt tathāgatena bodhim abhisambudhya tattvato na kecid dharmāḥ samupalabdhaḥ | tasmān māyāsvabhāvā evāmi bhāvāḥ pratibhāntīti pramāṇapuruṣādarśanakāraṇopapannānupalambabhāvanayā 'gradharmādhigamārtham vistareṇa srotāpattiphalapratipannakatvādidaśabhūmiṣv abhiniveśayogān na sthātavyam ity evaṃ bhāvanīyam iti |

Derge Tanjur 3791, *shes phyin, cha* 86b2–5: des cir 'gyur zhe na | de ltar slob pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras te | de ltar bsgoms pas rtogs pa'i chos kyi mchog gi bdag nyid can gyi shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i gnas pas gnas pa yin la | de nyid kyis na yid la byed pa 'di dang mi bral bar 'gyur pa'o || yin no zhes bya ba ni rab tu byed pa rdzogs pa'i don to || ngag gi don ni 'di yin te | gang gi phyir de bzhin

gshegs pas byang chub mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas de kho na nyid du na chos gang yang ma dmigs pa de'i phyir dngos po 'di dag sgyu ma'i rang bzhin kho na snang ba yin no zhes tshad mar gyur pa'i skeyes bus ma gzigs pa'i gtan tshigs kyis 'thad pa'i mi dmigs pa bsgoms pas rgyas pa rgyun du zhugs pa'i 'bras bu dang | zhugs pa la sogs pas sa bcu [D: sogs pa bcu] la mngon par zhen pa'i tshul gyis gnas par mi bya'o zhes de ltar bsgom par bya'o zhes bya ba yin no ||

<sup>113</sup> Tibetan has here *de ltar slob pa*, equivalent to the *evam hi śikṣamāṇo* of the scripture (see above n. 111), the last word of which is however not found in the Sanskrit editions of the *Aloka*.

<sup>114</sup> According to Kajiyama 1963: 1, n. \*\*, *anupalambha* “does not mean the absence of perception, nor what is not perception, nor perception of non-existence, but a negative perception, i. e., the perception of things other than the object concerned.”

<sup>115</sup> On the date of Ratnākaraśānti see most recently Kajiyama 1999: 1-5, and in considerable detail Mimaki 1992.

<sup>116</sup> The translators were Kṛṣṇapada and Tshul khrims rgyal ba. See Cordier 1915: 323, and Ruegg 1981: 107, n. 343. This same team translated Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvataṛakārikā*.

<sup>117</sup> Commenting on the first quotation in the tenth “theme” of the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, edited in Pāsādika 1989: 126 (Derge Tanjur 3934 *dbu ma*, ki 188b6-189a4). The passage being quoted is found in the second chapter of the sūtra, Kern and Nanjio 1908-1912: 40.13-15: ekam evāhaṃ śāriputra yānam ārabhya sattvānām dharmaṃ deśayāmi yad idaṃ buddhayānaṃ | na kiñcī chāriputra dvitīyaṃ vā ṛṭṭīyaṃ vā yānaṃ samvidyate | sarvatraiśā śāriputra dharmatā daśadigloke | tat kasya hetoḥ | ye 'pi te śāriputrāṭite ....

<sup>118</sup> Derge Tanjur 3935 *dbu ma*, ki 297a7-b1; Peking Tanjur 5331 *dbu ma*, a 346b4-6 (with remarkable variants): 'khor gyis log par rtog pa [P: ø rtog pa] 'ga' zhis sngar bstan pa ltar rgol ba ni | [P: ø] ci'i phyir zhe [P: ø zhe] na zhes bya'o || lan ni rigs pa ltar lung gi rang bzhin [P: nyid] tshad ma'i skeyes bur bsgrub pa ni | phyogs bcu'i zhes bya ba ste bcom ldan 'das shākya thub pa ni snyigs ma lnga [P: ø lnga] dang ldan pa'i kham su [P: gsum du for su] byon pas dman pa'o [P: pa'i?] snyam pa'i log rtog bsal ba'i phyir | [P: ø |]

sangs rgyas thams cad mnyam pa ste || [P: |]

sku tshe mtshan dang rigs kyis min ||

zhes bya ba'i tshul gyis gang 'das pa'i dus na byung ba'i zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no ||

I owe this reference to Mr. James Apple.

<sup>119</sup> I do not well understand the force of the expression *rigs pa ltar*.

<sup>120</sup> See the colophon in Cordier 1915: 277.

<sup>121</sup> My ignorance of the history of Tibetan Buddhist doctrine makes me unable to evaluate the possible relevance of the remark of van der Kuijp 1999: 657 that “Rgyal tshab's work, but not that of Mkhas grub, squarely places the notion of *tshad ma'i skeyes bu* in the anthropology of the stages-on-the-path (*lam rim*) concept of the *skeyes bu chen pa*, ‘superior person,’ a concept which, for the Tibetans, is closely associated with Atiśa's literary activity in Tibet (ca. 1041–54).” So too with the comment of Tillemans 1993: 8 that the notion of the *tshad ma'i skeyes bu* “makes a rapprochement

between the *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda*'s arguments and the position on the three scopes of personal motivation as we find explained in the *Bodhipathapradīpa* (verse 3–5) of Atiśa and the subsequent *Lam rim* literature of Tsong kha pa." I would only dare to ask the question whether, in light of the results of the present paper, the role of the thought of Atiśa himself in this dynamic might be discovered to have been somewhat less passive than such formulations make it appear.

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